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LockBit

Ransomware

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$2 million ransom demand on Kearney & Company by LockBit operators

Kearney & Company was targeted by LockBit 3.0, demanding a ransom payment of $2 million if they didn't want it to get exposed…

07-Nov-2022
2 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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NE

North Korean APT Group Kimsuky Exploits Trusted Platforms in Sophisticated Cyber...

The Securonix Threat Research team has uncovered a highly coordinated cyber espionage campaign, dubbed **DEEP#DRIVE**, linked to the North Korean state-sponsored group **Kimsuky**. The operation, active since late 2024, targets South Korean businesses, government agencies, and cryptocurrency users through meticulously crafted phishing lures and cloud-based infrastructure designed to evade detection. ### **Key Findings: A Multi-Stage Onslaught** - **Phishing Lures**: Attackers disguised malicious files as legitimate Korean-language documents, including work logs, insurance forms, and crypto-related guides, using double extensions (e.g., `.pdf.lnk`) to trick victims. - **Trusted Platforms Abused**: Dropbox served as the primary command-and-control (C2) hub for payload delivery and data exfiltration, exploiting its reputation to bypass security tools. - **Stealthy Execution**: PowerShell scripts, heavily obfuscated with junk code and Base64 encoding, enabled reconnaissance, persistence via scheduled tasks, and memory-resident malware deployment. - **Reconnaissance Focus**: Scripts harvested system details—IP addresses, antivirus software, running processes—to profile victims for further exploitation. --- ### **Inside the DEEP#DRIVE Attack Chain** #### **Stage 1: The Bait** The campaign began with phishing emails distributing ZIP archives containing shortcut files (`.lnk`). These files masqueraded as innocuous Office or PDF documents (e.g., `종신안내장V02_곽성환D.pdf.lnk`), leveraging Windows’ default hiding of file extensions. Once clicked, the `.lnk` triggered a PowerShell script padded with over 100 spaces to obscure its intent in logs. *Example Lure*: A fake forklift safety guide titled *지게차 중량물 윙바디 작업계획서.pptx* targeted logistics sector employees, while crypto-themed lures like *메타마스크 니모닉.txt* aimed at digital asset holders. #### **Stage 2: Obfuscation & Persistence** The initial PowerShell script (`user.ps1`) downloaded secondary payloads from Dropbox, including a decoy document to distract victims. A scheduled task named **ChromeUpdateTaskMachine** ensured the malware ran every 30 minutes, while `system_first.ps1` mapped victim environments: ```powershell # Sample recon commands from system_first.ps1 $ip = Get-WmiObject Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress $av = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\SecurityCenter2" -Class AntiVirusProduct | Select-Object -ExpandProperty displayName ``` Data was exfiltrated to Dropbox under `/github/cjfansgmlans1_first/[IP]-[timestamp]-RRR-cjfansgmlans1.txt`. #### **Stage 3: Payload Deployment** The final payload, `temp.ps1`, retrieved a Gzip-compressed .NET assembly (`system_drive.dat`) from Dropbox. After modifying its header to match Gzip signatures, the script loaded it directly into memory to execute a `Main` method—a technique avoiding disk-based detection. **Critical Oversight**: One payload, `Telegram.exe`, was mistakenly a renamed `.pptx` file, highlighting procedural errors in Kimsuky’s workflow. --- ### **Attribution to Kimsuky: Patterns of a Persistent Threat** Securonix researchers attributed DEEP#DRIVE to Kimsuky based on: - **Historical Use of Dropbox**: The group’s March 2024 **DEEP#GOSU** campaign employed identical cloud exfiltration tactics. - **Target Alignment**: Consistent focus on South Korean entities, particularly in sectors tied to regional security and economic interests. - **TTP Overlap**: Obfuscation methods, lure themes, and PowerShell-heavy execution mirrored past activities documented by CISA and other agencies. --- ### **Infrastructure Insights: A Fleeting Footprint** The attackers’ Dropbox accounts revealed a trove of victim data, including thousands of system profiles dating to September 2024. Phishing lures were stored in folders like `/github/`, with filenames tailored to Korean corporate jargon (e.g., *24년 10 월 업무일지* translates to *October 2024 Work Log*). **Notable Infrastructure**: - Payloads hosted at `hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent[.]com/scl/fi/ffrwxyw5reunc12416rmp/V3.rtf` - OAuth tokens enabled automated data harvesting, suggesting compromised developer accounts or insider access. --- ### **Implications & Recommendations** **Why It Matters**: DEEP#DRIVE underscores North Korea’s evolving cyber warfare tactics, blending social engineering with trusted services to exploit human and technical vulnerabilities. **Securonix Advisory**: 1. **Phishing Vigilance**: Train staff to scrutinize unsolicited attachments, especially those urging urgent action. 2. **Endpoint Hardening**: Enable PowerShell logging, restrict script execution, and monitor `%AppData%` for anomalous activity. 3. **Cloud Security**: Block unauthorized cloud storage access and inspect TLS traffic for C2 patterns. **Industry Quote**: *“Kimsuky’s abuse of Dropbox shows how attackers weaponize trust,”* said Den Iuzvyk, Securonix researcher. *“Defenders must assume legitimate services are potential threat vectors.”* --- ### **Broader Context: The Kimsuky Playbook** Active since 2012, Kimsuky (aka APT43) focuses on intelligence gathering to support Pyongyang’s geopolitical objectives. Recent campaigns have targeted academic institutions, think tanks, and defense contractors, often using credential theft and supply chain compromises. **MITRE ATT&CK Mapping**: - **Tactic**: Initial Access → **Phishing (T1566.001)** - **Technique**: Defense Evasion → **Obfuscated Files (T1027)** --- ### **Looking Ahead** While critical Dropbox links were swiftly dismantled, Kimsuky’s infrastructure agility suggests DEEP#DRIVE is one phase in a protracted campaign. Organizations are urged to adopt behavioral analytics and cross-platform monitoring to counter such adaptive adversaries. *For detection rules, IOCs, and hunting queries, refer to the full Securonix advisory [here].* --- *Stay informed with real-time threat intelligence at [Securonix.com].* --- **About Securonix Threat Research**: The team specializes in tracking APT groups, ransomware syndicates, and emerging cybercrime tactics. Follow their advisories for in-depth analysis and actionable insights.

loading..   14-Feb-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Sandworm

APT44

APT44 subgroup targets critical infrastructure worldwide in the BadPilot campaig...

APT44, a Russian state-sponsored hacking group, operates the subgroup **Seashell Blizzard** (aka Sandworm), responsible for the **BadPilot campaign**. Active since 2021, this subgroup focuses on **initial access** and **persistence** to enable destructive cyberattacks. Key objectives include intelligence gathering, operational disruption, and **wiper attacks** (data corruption). Microsoft attributes at least three destructive attacks in Ukraine (2023+) to this subgroup, with expanding global targeting in 2023–2024 (Europe, U.S., Middle East, UK, Canada, Australia). --- ### **Targets** - **Sectors**: Energy, oil/gas, telecoms, shipping, arms manufacturing, government, military, logistics. - **Geopolitical Context**: Intensified operations post-2022 Russia-Ukraine war, targeting critical infrastructure supporting Ukraine. Recent focus on Western allies (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia) suggests strategic alignment with Russian interests. --- ### **Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)** 1. **Initial Access**: - Exploitation of **n-day vulnerabilities**: - **CVE-2021-34473** (Exchange) - **CVE-2022-41352** (Zimbra) - **CVE-2023-32315** (OpenFire) - **CVE-2023-42793** (TeamCity) - **CVE-2023-23397** (Outlook) - **CVE-2024-1709** (ConnectWise ScreenConnect) - **CVE-2023-48788** (Fortinet FortiClient EMS). - **Credential theft** and **supply chain attacks** (via regional IT providers in Europe/Ukraine). 2. **Persistence**: - Custom web shells (e.g., **LocalOlive**). - Legitimate remote tools (**Atera Agent**, **Splashtop**) masquerading as IT admin activity. 3. **Post-Compromise Activity**: - **Credential Dumping**: Procdump, Windows registry. - **Data Exfiltration**: Rclone, Chisel, Plink (via covert tunnels). - **Lateral Movement**: DNS manipulation, new services/scheduled tasks, OpenSSH backdoors with unique keys. - **Evasion**: Tor network routing (2024), reducing visibility for defenders. --- ### **Evolution and Global Reach** - **2021–2022**: Opportunistic targeting in Ukraine, Central/South Asia, Middle East. - **2023**: Expanded to Europe, U.S., Middle East; destructive attacks in Ukraine. - **2024**: Shift to Five Eyes nations (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia); adoption of Tor and living-off-the-land (LOLBin) tactics. --- ### **Mitigation Recommendations** 1. **Patch Management**: Prioritize vulnerabilities listed above, especially Exchange, Outlook, Fortinet, and ConnectWise. 2. **Monitor for LOLBin Activity**: Audit remote management tools (Atera, Splashtop) for unauthorized use. 3. **Network Defense**: - Detect Tor traffic and covert tunnels (Chisel/Plink). - Analyze DNS/SMB traffic for anomalies (CVE-2023-23397 exploitation). 4. **Credential Hardening**: Implement MFA, restrict NTLM usage, monitor for Procdump/registry credential dumps. 5. **Supply Chain Risk**: Vet third-party IT providers; segment networks to limit lateral movement. 6. **Lateral Movement Detection**: Hunt for unexpected SSH keys, scheduled tasks, and service creations. --- ### **Microsoft Resources** - **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)**: Integrate into SIEM/EDR for real-time alerts. - **YARA Rules**: Deploy to detect malware (e.g., LocalOlive). - **Hunting Queries**: Proactively search for TTPs like credential dumping or Tor usage. --- ### **Strategic Implications** Seashell Blizzard’s operations underscore Russia’s focus on **asymmetric cyber warfare**, leveraging state-sponsored groups to disrupt adversaries and gather intelligence. Defenders must adopt a proactive stance, combining threat intelligence (e.g., Microsoft’s reports) with robust vulnerability management and network monitoring.

loading..   12-Feb-2025
loading..   3 min read
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Outage

Newspaper

A devastating cyberattack on Lee Enterprises cripples U.S. newsrooms, affecting ...

A devastating cyberattack paralyzed Lee Enterprises, one of America’s largest newspaper groups, causing widespread disruption to its print and digital operations. This breach, which is still under investigation, has forced the company to shut down critical systems, including its networks, VPNs, and editorial tools, affecting its ability to deliver timely news to millions of readers across the U.S. As the media industry grapples with increasing cyber threats, Lee Enterprises’ struggle represents a much larger challenge facing journalism today: How can news organizations safeguard the public’s access to information in an era of escalating cyber warfare? ### **How Lee Enterprises Fell Victim to Cyber Warfare** Lee Enterprises’ February 3 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission revealed that the cyberattack targeted key business applications, crippling the company’s ability to print newspapers, deliver digital editions, and manage subscriber services. As the company worked to assess the full impact of the breach, employees—many working remotely—were cut off from critical systems that allowed them to access newsrooms, sources, and essential data. _“This was no ordinary disruption,”_ said a senior reporter at [Lee Enterprises](http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/58361/000162828025004469/lee-20241229.htm#i2b56eed49a654ccea96796e4edec9989_106), who requested anonymity. _“We were essentially flying blind. With VPNs down and systems locked, it was impossible to do the basic work of reporting. There was chaos, not just in the newsroom, but throughout the entire organization.”_ ### **Escalating Security Concerns in Journalism** Cybersecurity experts warn that this is part of a broader, concerning trend in the media industry. _"Media companies are now prime targets for cyberattacks,"_ [said](https://buffalonews.com/news/local/buffalo-new-cybersecurity-event-lee-enterprises/article_6dc5e704-e5b4-11ef-b07f-db0b5c918647.html) Dr. Elizabeth Gomez, a cybersecurity expert at TechSecure. _"Attacks like the one on Lee Enterprises not only disrupt operations but are designed to erode trust in the very news organizations people rely on."_ The impact on Lee Enterprises echoes broader concerns within the industry. According to a recent report by the Media Security Alliance, cyberattacks against news organizations have increased by 35% over the past two years. Experts believe this surge in cybercrime is due to a variety of factors, including increased reliance on digital tools, the potential for financial disruption, and the political motivations behind attacks targeting news outlets. For the public, these disruptions represent more than just an inconvenience—they are a breach of the social contract between news organizations and the communities they serve. ### **Human Cost of a Cyberattack on Journalism** The fallout from the breach has been deeply felt within Lee Enterprises, particularly by the reporters and editors who are the backbone of its 77 daily newspapers and 350 weekly publications. Behind the headlines, one employee shared how they resorted to old-school methods of communication to keep the newsroom afloat: “We had to pick up the phone and manually pull together information from sources. It felt like stepping back into the 90s, but with a greater sense of urgency.” This personal account underscores the vulnerability that media organizations face. The digital infrastructure that allows for seamless news production also makes them susceptible to total collapse in the event of a cyberattack. ### **Beyond the Headlines: How This Attack Will Reshape Media’s Digital Security** The attack on Lee Enterprises is part of a wider cybersecurity dilemma for journalism. As more newsrooms transition to digital-first strategies, they are also increasing their exposure to cyberattacks, which threaten not just business continuity but public trust. _“Trust in media is eroded whenever an attack like this happens,”_ says Mary Thompson, a media ethics professor at Columbia University. _“Journalists are not just curators of news—they are the keepers of truth. When their platforms are compromised, it damages the very fabric of democratic society.”_ With that in mind, the media industry must take a hard look at its current cybersecurity posture. As Dr. Gomez notes, _"The evolution of cybersecurity in journalism will be the defining challenge of the next decade. The question isn’t whether these attacks will stop—it’s whether media companies are willing to adapt quickly enough to prevent them."_

loading..   11-Feb-2025
loading..   4 min read