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37,000 PyPI Downloads: Fabric Typosquatting Supply Chain Attack Steals AWS

Fabrice malware, a PyPI typosquatting supply chain attack, steals AWS credentials from Linux & Windows. Learn how to protect against similar threats.

11-Nov-2024
6 min read

Related Articles

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macOS

Flutter

Discover how DPRK-backed actors use Flutter apps to bypass Apple security and ta...

A newly discovered macOS app, linked to DPRK, conceals sophisticated malware designed to breach system defenses. The malware uses advanced obfuscation tactics, such as packing the code and encrypting certain components, to evade detection. This campaign, discovered by Jamf Threat Labs, highlights the evolving threat posed by DPRK-backed actors, who often target sensitive data and use techniques such as social engineering and code obfuscation. This advanced persistent threat (APT) utilizes Flutter-built applications. Flutter's inherent obfuscation capabilities make it highly effective at evading detection. Features like hiding dynamic library calls and obscuring code flow complicate the analysis process, effectively aiding in concealing malicious activity. The findings mark a concerning escalation in novel methodologies used to breach macOS defenses, including cross-platform tools and techniques to bypass Apple notarization. ### DPRK Targets macOS Using Flutter-Built Malware In October, Jamf Threat Labs detected several malware samples uploaded to VirusTotal, a widely used malware analysis platform, that initially evaded detection despite exhibiting malicious behavior. Analysis of these samples pointed toward DPRK actors, with techniques aligning closely with previously observed malware campaigns. Disturbingly, some malware versions had even managed to pass Apple's notarization process temporarily, indicating sophisticated obfuscation and manipulation tactics. ### Complexity of the Flutter Packaging The malware was discovered in three different packaging forms: Go, Python, and Flutter. Among these, the Flutter variant stood out due to its complexity in reversing and analysis. Flutter, a cross-platform framework developed by Google, is typically used for consistent app design across platforms like macOS, iOS, and Android. For legitimate developers, Flutter's ability to write once and deploy across multiple platforms saves significant development time and resources, making it an attractive option. These same benefits also appeal to attackers, as they can create malware with broader reach and less effort. For example, popular apps like Google Ads and Alibaba are built using Flutter, demonstrating its versatility for creating high-performance cross-platform solutions. Its cross-platform capabilities are appealing to attackers because they can create malware that works across multiple operating systems with minimal adjustments, broadening the scope of potential targets. Its use makes malware more challenging to analyze due to the obfuscation capabilities inherent in how Flutter compiles its applications. Its unique structure, particularly the use of the Dart programming language compiled into dynamic library (dylib) files, makes the code inherently obscure, providing a natural avenue for obfuscation. In standard Flutter applications, the app logic is encapsulated in a dylib, loaded by the Flutter engine rather than directly by the primary executable. This level of abstraction complicates the analysis process as the dylib is not explicitly referenced in the main application executable. While this architecture is designed to optimize cross-platform compatibility, it inadvertently serves as a highly effective method for concealing malicious logic. ![Flutter Layout](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/flutter_0c0702e574.jpg) ***Flutter Layout (Source: Jamf)*** ### Anatomy of the Discovered Malware The identified malware functions as a stage-one payload, meaning it serves as the initial component in a multi-stage attack designed to establish a foothold, gather information, or prepare the system for more complex payloads that follow. Among the samples, six infected applications were detected, with five bearing valid developer signatures that had already been revoked by Apple at the time of discovery. One such app, titled _"New Updates in Crypto Exchange,"_ presented itself as a functional minesweeper game. However, upon execution, it initiated a network request to a domain (_“mbupdate[.]linkpc[.]net”_) previously linked to DPRK malware campaigns. The malicious code was deeply embedded within the application, with pre-compiled Dart snapshots complicating any decompilation or analysis attempts due to the need for specialized tools and the extra layer of abstraction that Dart introduces. Further investigation revealed that the malware could execute remote AppleScript commands, such as launching applications, modifying system settings, or downloading additional malicious components. This capability allows attackers to take control of infected devices using sophisticated payload delivery mechanisms. ### Golang and Python Variants In addition to the Flutter version, Jamf Threat Labs also [identified](https://www.jamf.com/blog/jamf-threat-labs-apt-actors-embed-malware-within-macos-flutter-applications/) Go and Python variants of the malware. The [Golang](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/chinese-hackers-dragon-spark-use-golang-to-launch-espionage-attacks) variant, similarly signed and notarized by Apple, mirrored the network request and payload execution seen in the Flutter version. This included making HTTPS requests to command-and-control servers and executing payloads, using comparable obfuscation and scripting techniques. The use of different programming languages, such as Golang and Flutter, highlights the attackers' adaptability and their ability to exploit various ecosystems, which complicates detection and mitigation by requiring different analysis tools and expertise for each language. This further demonstrated the attackers' adeptness at exploiting different programming ecosystems to maintain their campaign's adaptability. ![https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/1220909/2024/Phishing/24/signed.jpg](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/signed_6f8ba5bc61.jpg) ***Trojanized Mindsweeper (Source: Jamf)*** The Python variant, built using Py2App, was crafted as a standalone application. While it appeared to be a functional notepad app, malicious components were embedded within the Python script, enabling it to send and execute commands from a remote server. The consistent use of 'osascript' across these variants suggests a preference for exploiting native macOS features to achieve execution. Leveraging native features like 'osascript' allows attackers to exploit macOS's trusted components, such as built-in automation tools like Automator, making the malware more difficult to detect and resist. By leveraging its trusted status within macOS environments, attackers make detection even more challenging. For instance, 'osascript' has been previously used in malware attacks to execute AppleScript commands, which are often trusted by the system and less likely to trigger traditional antivirus alerts, making this technique particularly effective in avoiding detection. ### A New Testing Ground for Future Attacks? The findings suggest that this malware campaign could be a test run for future, more extensive attacks. The use of legitimate-looking applications, such as those with similar names to popular software or polished user interfaces, along with signed developer accounts and advanced obfuscation techniques, suggests a deliberate effort to bypass security measures. This points towards a strategic probing of macOS's security architecture, indicating attackers' intent to identify and exploit weaknesses in the system. DPRK's history of leveraging sophisticated social engineering campaigns further raises concerns about the potential evolution of these malware tools. The clear mismatch between the content of these apps and their filenames—where the app names suggest legitimate functionality, but the actual code contains malicious behavior—implies an attempt to test whether Apple’s notarization process could be circumvented with carefully concealed malicious components. Additionally, the use of Flutter as a delivery mechanism is a novel approach for DPRK actors, demonstrating their willingness to experiment with different frameworks and methodologies to evade security measures. ### Conclusion and Implications for macOS Security The discovery of DPRK-backed malware utilizing Flutter-built applications to target macOS users highlights the evolving threat landscape. This sophisticated campaign illustrates how attackers refine their tactics to exploit legitimate development frameworks and leverage vulnerabilities in Apple's notarization process. Although it remains uncertain whether this specific malware campaign was intended for broad deployment or as a proof of concept, it underscores the need for heightened vigilance and more robust security defenses for macOS. To counter these threats effectively, measures could include stricter application signing requirements, enhancing behavioral detection systems using machine learning-based anomaly detection tools (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint), and employing advanced threat-hunting tools like Splunk or Carbon Black to identify unusual patterns and vulnerabilities. Jamf Threat Labs remains committed to monitoring and analyzing further developments in this campaign, ensuring that macOS users are well-protected against emerging threats. ### Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) The following domains, signatures, and application identifiers have been flagged as part of this investigation: - Domain: mbupdate[.]linkpc[.]net - Applications: "New Updates in Crypto Exchange (2024-08-28).app" - Malware signatures: Flutter dylib containing Dart snapshots (_kDartVmSnapshotData, _kDartIsolateSnapshotInstructions) For detailed technical insights and mitigations, Jamf Threat Labs has your back—while Jamf solutions ensure macOS security for everything else.

loading..   13-Nov-2024
loading..   7 min read
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Ransomhub

Halliburton faces a $35 million loss after a ransomware attack, with ongoing ris...

The consequences of the August ransomware attack on [Halliburton](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/halliburton-s-global-business-operations-crippled-by-major-cyberattack) are becoming increasingly clear, exposing vulnerabilities in the company's security systems, such as outdated firewalls and poor network segmentation. As the company continues to mitigate the aftermath, experts point out that the underlying risks extend beyond the immediate $35 million loss that initially grabbed headlines. These risks include potential reputational damage, loss of customer trust, increased regulatory scrutiny, and the possibility of further cyberattacks. ### **mmediate Response and Lingering Concerns** Halliburton, a global giant in the energy services sector, suffering significant disruption following the [August breach](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/210-victims-in-halliburton-cyberattack-linked-to-ransom-hub-ransomware) by the RansomHub ransomware gang. The company’s swift response—shutting down IT systems and disconnecting customer platforms—helped contain the immediate impact. However, it only addressed the short-term disruption. A larger issue remains regarding the long-term implications of the stolen data, such as legal consequences, reputational damage, operational changes, and potential misuse. The focus now is on the nature of the data stolen—including employee records, client contracts, proprietary operational data, and sensitive financial details—and the potential long-term consequences for Halliburton and its clients. In its August 23 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Halliburton disclosed that the breach involved unauthorized access to its internal systems. Later, a subsequent 8-K Form confirmed that threat actors had successfully exfiltrated sensitive information from the company’s network. However, the specifics of what data was stolen remain unclear, with ongoing investigations keeping stakeholders in the dark. ### **Potential Consequences and Legal Risks** This lack of clarity has raised concerns about the potential exposure of highly confidential client information, which could lead to cascading consequences—including regulatory penalties, loss of major clients, legal actions, and a severe blow to Halliburton’s brand reputation. Industry experts are increasingly cautious, emphasizing that should sensitive data be sold or leaked, Halliburton could face numerous lawsuits and regulatory challenges. These challenges include potential fines from data privacy regulators and compliance issues under industry-specific cybersecurity mandates, especially if client-specific proprietary information or trade secrets were compromised. ### **Halliburton Earnings and Strategic Measures** The recent update from Halliburton’s earnings report suggests that while the company experienced a minor financial hit in the short term—a $0.02 per share impact—the broader implications of data leakage are likely far from over. Chairman and CEO Jeff Miller has expressed optimism, asserting that the company’s overall financial targets remain intact, with free cash flow and shareholder returns expected to improve in the upcoming quarter. He emphasized that the company is focusing on strategic cost-cutting measures, strengthening client relationships, and investing in enhanced cybersecurity defenses to achieve these targets amidst ongoing challenges. However, this optimism contrasts sharply with the ongoing uncertainty regarding the stolen data. The company faces dual challenges: maintaining financial stability and addressing unresolved cybersecurity threats, such as potential backdoors left by attackers, incomplete remediation efforts, and the risk of future data leaks. It is increasingly evident that the cyberattack's legacy will extend beyond immediate operational disruptions and short-term financial losses. ### **Long-Term Impacts and Stakeholder Trust** A critical nuance in this situation is the uncertainty regarding the scope of data held by the ransomware group. Unlike direct financial losses, data-related breaches often have a staggered impact, manifesting over months or even years as stolen information can be repurposed or resurfaced in ways that damage both clients and companies alike. For example, the Equifax data breach of 2017 led to long-term impacts including identity theft and substantial legal and regulatory repercussions, illustrating how such incidents can have extended consequences. Data stolen today might be used in future phishing attacks or sold to competitors, leading to identity theft or industrial espionage. Such actions create ongoing and far-reaching risks. Experts have highlighted that even the simple act of maintaining trust among Halliburton’s stakeholders—whether they are investors, partners, or clients—requires careful and deliberate effort following such a breach. Investors may expect clear, consistent updates on cybersecurity improvements, partners might be concerned about data-sharing security, and clients could fear future breaches affecting their own sensitive information. Specific actions, such as enhanced communication with clients, increased transparency about security measures, and offering identity protection services, could be crucial in rebuilding this trust. The attack also puts a spotlight on the systemic vulnerabilities faced by large corporations dependent on interconnected IT infrastructure. As Halliburton scrambles to bolster its cybersecurity posture, it becomes evident that companies across the energy sector must reevaluate their digital defenses by conducting regular penetration tests, increasing employee cybersecurity training, and enhancing incident response plans. Cybersecurity specialists argue that the breach underscores the importance of implementing robust zero-trust architecture, which requires strict verification for every user or device attempting to access resources. Additionally, frequent security audits are crucial, rather than relying solely on reactive measures post-incident. These proactive steps could help mitigate the risks of similar breaches in the future. ### **Halliburton's Recovery Plan and Industry Insights** For Halliburton, the narrative from here is not just about financial recuperation but about proactively addressing concerns related to the stolen data. While immediate [revenue projections](https://ir.halliburton.com/static-files/bd0b8a6f-bf31-434e-bc9d-2ee0532e89d2) seem stable, the potential long-term costs associated with data misuse could dwarf the initially reported $35 million hit. The trajectory of these events will likely shape the company's strategy in navigating cybersecurity resilience, legal liabilities, and reputation management over the coming months. ### **Key Takeaways for Preventing Ransomware Attacks** As the investigation progresses, the industry at large is keeping a close watch. Halliburton’s experience serves as a stark reminder—ransomware breaches do not just affect the present; their legacy can linger, threatening future stability through potential regulatory fines, ongoing litigation, and long-term reputational damage if critical data remains at risk. To mitigate these risks, companies should implement stronger cybersecurity protocols, regularly update their security measures, and conduct thorough training for employees to recognize and respond to cyber threats.

loading..   12-Nov-2024
loading..   6 min read
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MacOS

BlueNoroff

BlueNoroff APT group targets macOS with fake crypto news and novel persistence, ...

In recent years, the cybersecurity community has observed a surge in state-sponsored attacks focusing on the financial sector, particularly targeting cryptocurrency enterprises. The BlueNoroff APT group, a subdivision of North Korea's Lazarus Group, has been at the forefront of these activities. Demonstrating advanced capabilities, BlueNoroff has developed sophisticated macOS malware that exploits fake cryptocurrency news to deceive targets and employs novel persistence mechanisms to maintain long-term access. This technical report provides an exhaustive analysis of BlueNoroff's recent campaigns up to October 2023. It delves into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), offering insights into the malware's architecture and providing recommendations for mitigation. --- ## Campaign Overview ### Background Active since at least 2016, BlueNoroff has primarily targeted financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. Their operations are financially motivated, aiming to circumvent international sanctions by stealing funds to support North Korea's economic objectives. ### Recent Activities BlueNoroff has intensified its efforts against macOS platforms, acknowledging the increasing use of Apple devices in corporate settings. Notable campaigns include: - **RustBucket Campaign (April 2023):** Deployed multi-stage malware written in Rust, targeting macOS users and establishing backdoors for executing arbitrary code. - **KandyKorn Malware (May 2023):** Focused on blockchain engineers, delivering malware designed for persistent system access. --- ## Infection Vector ### Phishing Emails Leveraging Fake Cryptocurrency News The primary infection method involves phishing emails containing links to malicious applications disguised as legitimate PDF documents discussing cryptocurrency trends. - **Email Characteristics:** - **Sender Impersonation:** Often uses names of reputable individuals in the crypto industry or unrelated fields to appear credible. - **Subject Matter:** Topics like "Hidden Risks Behind New Surge of Bitcoin Price" or "Altcoin Season 2.0: The Hidden Gems to Watch." - **Attachments:** Instead of PDFs, the attachments are macOS application bundles posing as documents. ### Execution Flow 1. **Email Delivery:** The target receives a phishing email with a link to a supposed PDF document. 2. **Malicious Application Download:** Clicking the link downloads a macOS application bundle with a misleading name and icon. 3. **Decoy Document Display:** Upon execution, the application opens a legitimate-looking PDF to avoid suspicion. 4. **Background Malware Installation:** Concurrently, the application downloads and executes the next-stage payload. --- ## Technical Analysis ### Stage 1: The Dropper Application - **Implementation:** Written in Swift, designed to appear as a legitimate document viewer. - **Code Signing:** Often signed with valid Apple Developer IDs to bypass Gatekeeper protections. These IDs may be acquired through fraudulent means. - **Execution Details:** - **Decoy Presentation:** Downloads a benign PDF from a remote server and opens it using the default PDF viewer. - **Payload Retrieval:** Fetches the second-stage malware from a hard-coded URL using insecure HTTP connections, bypassing default macOS security settings via `Info.plist` modifications. - **Bypassing Security Measures:** - **App Transport Security Exception:** Alters `Info.plist` to allow insecure connections to specific domains. - **Universal Binary:** Compiled for both Intel and Apple Silicon architectures to maximize compatibility. ### Stage 2: The Backdoor Payload - **File Details:** - **Name:** `growth` - **Architecture:** x86_64, requiring Rosetta 2 on Apple Silicon Macs. - **Language:** Written in C++, focusing on functionality over stealth. - **Functionalities:** - **Persistence Installation:** Installs a novel persistence mechanism via the `~/.zshenv` file. - **System Reconnaissance:** Collects system information such as OS version, hardware model, and process lists. - **Unique Identifier Generation:** Creates a random UUID to identify the infected machine. - **C2 Communication:** - **Protocol:** Communicates with the command and control server using HTTP POST requests. - **Data Transmission:** Sends collected data and awaits commands. - **Command Execution:** Processes C2 responses to execute arbitrary commands or download additional payloads. - **Code Characteristics:** - **Minimal Obfuscation:** Relies on deceptive practices rather than heavy code obfuscation. - **Persistence Logic:** Encapsulated in specific functions for installing and verifying persistence mechanisms. ### Novel Persistence Mechanism: Abusing `~/.zshenv` - **Mechanism Details:** - **File Modification:** The malware appends execution commands to the `~/.zshenv` file. - **Execution Scope:** Since `~/.zshenv` is sourced in all Zsh sessions—including non-interactive ones—the malware gains execution whenever a shell is invoked, which can occur during various system processes. - **Advantages Over Traditional Methods:** - **Stealth:** This method does not trigger user notifications introduced in macOS Ventura for Login Items, making it less noticeable. - **Reliability:** Ensures consistent execution without relying on Launch Agents or Daemons, which are more likely to be monitored or removed. - **Persistence Installation Function:** - **Verification:** Checks for a marker file (e.g., `.zsh_init_success`) to prevent redundant installations. - **Implementation:** Uses shell commands within the malware code to modify the `~/.zshenv` file. --- ## Network Infrastructure Analysis ### Command and Control Servers - **Domain Mimicry:** Domains are crafted to resemble legitimate cryptocurrency or financial services (e.g., `delphidigital[.]org`, `arkinvest[.]com`). - **Hosting Providers:** Utilizes services known for lax enforcement to host malicious domains and servers. - **SSL Certificates:** May reuse self-signed certificates across multiple domains, aiding in attribution. ### Communication Protocols - **HTTP POST Requests:** Malware communicates using standard HTTP protocols to blend in with normal traffic. - **Custom User-Agent Strings:** Employs unique or spoofed User-Agent strings to avoid detection by security tools. ### Infrastructure Linkage - **WHOIS Data and Registrar Patterns:** Consistent use of certain domain registrars and overlapping registration details. - **Shared Resources:** Reuse of IP addresses and hosting services across different campaigns. --- ## Attribution to BlueNoroff Attribution is based on multiple factors: - **Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs):** - **Malware Similarities:** Overlaps with previous BlueNoroff malware, including code structure and functionality. - **Persistence Methods:** Novel use of `~/.zshenv` aligns with the group's history of exploiting macOS features. - **Infrastructure Connections:** - **Domain Themes:** Consistent focus on cryptocurrency and financial entities. - **Technical Overlaps:** Shared IP addresses and SSL certificates with known BlueNoroff infrastructure. - **Historical Context:** - **Financial Motive:** Aligns with North Korea's strategy of using cyber operations for economic gain. - **Prior Campaigns:** Continuation of methods observed in operations like AppleJeus and previous RustBucket incidents. --- ## Mitigation Strategies ### User Awareness and Training - **Phishing Education:** Regular training to recognize and report suspicious emails, especially those related to financial topics. - **Policy Enforcement:** Implement strict policies regarding the opening of email attachments and execution of downloaded files. ### Technical Controls - **Endpoint Protection:** - **Anti-Malware Solutions:** Deploy advanced security software capable of detecting and blocking known threats and suspicious behaviors. - **Application Whitelisting:** Restrict execution to approved applications, preventing unauthorized code from running. - **System Monitoring:** - **File Integrity Monitoring:** Watch for changes to critical files like `~/.zshenv` and system binaries. - **Process Monitoring:** Alert on the execution of unexpected processes or scripts. - **Network Security:** - **Firewall Rules:** Block known malicious IP addresses and domains associated with BlueNoroff. - **Network Traffic Analysis:** Inspect outbound traffic for anomalies, such as unusual HTTP POST requests. ### Incident Response Preparedness - **Response Planning:** Develop and regularly update incident response plans specific to malware infections. - **Backup and Recovery:** Maintain regular backups of critical systems and data to enable restoration in case of compromise. - **Threat Intelligence Integration:** Incorporate the latest threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging threats. --- ## Conclusion The BlueNoroff APT group's ongoing targeting of macOS systems within the cryptocurrency sector highlights the evolving tactics of state-sponsored actors. Their innovative methods—such as abusing the `~/.zshenv` file for persistence and leveraging convincing phishing lures—underscore the need for heightened vigilance and robust security measures. Organizations in the financial and cryptocurrency industries must adopt a comprehensive security posture, combining user education, advanced technical defenses, and proactive monitoring to mitigate the risks posed by such sophisticated threats. --- ## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ### File Hashes (SHA-1) - **Dropper Applications:** - `3f17c5a7d1e7fd138163d8039e614b8a967a56cb` - `e5d97afa5f1501b3d5ec1a471dc8a3b8e2a84fdb` - **Backdoor Payload:** - `7e07765bf8ee2d0b2233039623016d6dfb610a6d` ### Malicious Domains - `delphidigital[.]org` - `matuaner[.]com` - `arkinvst[.]com` - `solanalab[.]org` - `zoom-client[.]com` - Additional domains listed in the campaign's indicators. ### IP Addresses - `23.254.253[.]75` - `45.61.135[.]105` - `172.86.108[.]47` - `216.107.136[.]10` - Additional IPs associated with the C2 infrastructure. --- ## References - **SentinelLabs Report on Hidden Risk Campaign:** [Link to Original Report](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bluenoroff-hidden-risk-threat-actor-targets-macs-with-fake-crypto-news-and-novel-persistence/) - **ESET Research on RustBucket Malware:** [ESET Blog](https://www.welivesecurity.com/) - **Apple Documentation on Zsh Startup Files:** [Apple Support](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208050) - **MITRE ATT&CK Framework - Lazarus Group:** [MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032/) --- **Disclaimer:** This document is based on information available up to October 2023. Subsequent developments may not be reflected.

loading..   09-Nov-2024
loading..   7 min read