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Hack

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Erie Insurance Confirms Cyberattack Behind Ongoing Outages; Customer Portals, Claims Processing Disrupted

Erie Insurance cyberattack (June 7) causes portal outages & claims disruption. Investigation ongoing. Urgent scam alert: ERIE won't call for payments. Details.

12-Jun-2025
5 min read

No content available.

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Info Stealer

Hackers exploit Discord invite links to spread advanced malware, targeting crypt...

Security researchers have uncovered a highly sophisticated malware campaign that exploits a critical vulnerability in Discord’s invitation system, redirecting users from trusted community links to malicious servers designed to steal cryptocurrency assets and establish persistent remote access to victims' computers. ## Campaign Overview and Scale Check Point Research revealed this active campaign in June 2025, documenting how cybercriminals have successfully compromised over 1,300 users across eight countries by hijacking expired Discord invite links and weaponizing them for multi-stage malware delivery. ![image (14).png](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/image_14_c7db3a0327.png) **Geographic Distribution of Discord Invite Link Hijacking Campaign Victims** The operation, which has been active since August 2024, represents a significant evolution in social engineering tactics that leverage trusted platforms for malicious purposes. The campaign’s global reach spans multiple continents, with the United States and Vietnam showing the highest concentration of victims, followed by significant impacts in France, Germany, and other European nations. This geographic distribution suggests a targeted approach that exploits regional gaming communities and cryptocurrency adoption patterns. ## Discord Vulnerability-How Invite Links Become Weapons The attack exploits a fundamental flaw in Discord's custom vanity invite link system, which allows servers with premium subscriptions to create personalized invitation codes. When legitimate servers lose their boost status or links expire, these codes become available for reuse by malicious actors who can register them as custom vanity URLs on their own boosted servers. This vulnerability affects three types of Discord invitations with varying degrees of risk. Temporary invite links become completely vulnerable after expiration, while permanent invites face conditional risk only when deleted and contain exclusively lowercase letters and digits. Custom vanity invites present the highest ongoing risk when original servers lose their premium status. Discord's interface design compounds this security issue through a misleading user experience. When users attempt to make existing temporary invites permanent by checking the _"Set this link to never expire"_ option, the system displays a false confirmation while leaving the underlying invitation code unchanged. This design flaw has directly contributed to the campaign’s success, as users unknowingly publish temporary invites under the false assumption they are permanent. ## Multi-Stage Attack Chain: From Trust to Compromise The attack begins when unsuspecting users click previously legitimate invite links on community forums, social media, or official websites. Instead of reaching their intended destination, victims are silently redirected to attacker-controlled Discord servers meticulously designed to appear authentic. ![image (15).png](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/image_15_fcc14957e6.png) Upon joining these malicious servers, users encounter a sophisticated social engineering scheme. Most channels remain locked, with only a single "verify" channel accessible, where a bot named "Safeguard" prompts newcomers to complete a verification process. This bot, explicitly created for the campaign in February 2025, requests authorization and redirects users to an external phishing website designed to mimic Discord's interface. The campaign employs the increasingly popular "[ClickFix](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/state-sponsored-hackers-leverage-click-fix-social-engineering-in-global-cyber-espionage)" social engineering technique, a method that has gained significant traction among cybercriminals throughout 2024 and into 2025. This technique presents users with a fake error message—typically a failed Google CAPTCHA—and provides detailed instructions for "fixing" the problem. The solution involves opening the Windows Run dialog and executing a malicious PowerShell command secretly copied to the user’s clipboard. ## Advanced Evasion and Payload Delivery The malware delivery system demonstrates remarkable sophistication in evading detection through multiple layers of obfuscation and legitimate service abuse. The initial PowerShell script, hosted on Pastebin, achieved zero detections across all major antivirus engines during analysis. This script downloads a first-stage executable from GitHub repositories, which maintained an extraordinarily low detection rate of just one out of seventy antivirus engines. ![image (17).png](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/image_17_25969d0908.png) **VirusTotal Detection Rates for Discord Campaign Malware Components** The campaign’s infrastructure exclusively leverages trusted cloud services to blend malicious traffic with legitimate network activity. Attackers dynamically rotate between GitHub repositories for malware hosting, use Bitbucket for encrypted payload storage, and employ Pastebin for script hosting with frequent URL updates. This approach allows the operation to maintain persistence while avoiding traditional security controls that might flag suspicious domains. ![image (18).png](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/image_18_03cbea1a3f.png) **Legitimate Services Abused in Discord Invite Link Hijacking Campaign** The malware employs sophisticated time-based evasion techniques to circumvent automated sandbox analysis. Initial execution requires specific command-line parameters, and the full malicious payload only becomes active after a carefully orchestrated 15-minute delay involving multiple staged downloads and decryption processes. This temporal separation ensures that automated security systems cannot observe the complete attack chain during typical analysis windows. ## Cryptocurrency-Focused Payloads The campaign deploys two primary malware families, each serving distinct but complementary functions in the attackers’ financial objectives. AsyncRAT, a well-established remote access trojan, provides comprehensive system control capabilities including keylogging, screen capture, and file manipulation. The malware uses a _"dead drop resolver"_ technique, retrieving its command-and-control server addresses from publicly accessible Pastebin documents to maintain operational flexibility. The second payload, a customized variant of the Skuld Stealer, specifically targets cryptocurrency infrastructure with devastating precision. This Go-based information stealer focuses primarily on Exodus and Atomic wallet applications, employing a sophisticated injection technique that replaces legitimate wallet archives with malicious versions downloaded from GitHub. The cryptocurrency targeting mechanism represents a particularly insidious form of supply chain attack. When users interact with their compromised wallets, malicious JavaScript code intercepts sensitive operations, extracting both password credentials and seed phrases—the master keys that provide complete control over cryptocurrency holdings. This stolen information is immediately transmitted to attackers via dedicated Discord webhooks, ensuring rapid monetization of compromised accounts. ![image (19).png](https://sb-cms.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/image_19_28428a48c3.png) **A conceptual diagram illustrating various behaviors and characteristics of malware, including multi-stage execution and persistence mechanisms FIRST** ## Bypassing Modern Security Controls. The campaign’s technical sophistication extends to circumventing cutting-edge browser security features, specifically Google Chrome's Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) introduced in 2024. By binding encryption to system-level privileges, Chrome's ABE was designed to prevent information-stealing malware from accessing encrypted cookie data. However, the attackers adapted the open-source ChromeKatz tool to bypass this protection through direct browser memory manipulation. This technique operates within the browser’s NetworkService process, using signature-based searches to locate and extract cookie data from memory structures before encryption can occur. The bypass requires minimal system privileges and can operate undetected by most endpoint security solutions. ## Gaming Community Exploitation Beyond the primary Discord campaign, researchers identified a parallel operation targeting gaming communities through trojanized software. This variant distributes malicious archives disguised as game modification tools, specifically targeting The Sims 4 players with fake DLC unlocking utilities. The gaming-focused campaign has achieved over 350 documented downloads, demonstrating the attackers' ability to diversify their initial access vectors while maintaining the same core malware infrastructure. This gaming angle reflects broader trends in cybercriminal targeting, with recent research showing over 19 million attempted attacks disguising malware as popular video games throughout 2024 and early 2025. The overlap between gaming and cryptocurrency communities creates particularly attractive targets for financially motivated threat actors. ## Industry Response and Platform Measures Discord responded to the research findings by disabling the malicious "Safeguard" bot identified in the campaign, effectively breaking the current attack chain. However, security experts emphasize that this represents a tactical disruption rather than a strategic solution, as the underlying vulnerability in the invitation system remains unaddressed. The platform has historically faced significant challenges with malicious content, as evidenced by enforcement statistics showing over 26 million accounts disabled for spam-related violations in a single quarter. Despite proactive scanning for malware and user reporting mechanisms, Discord’s infrastructure remains an attractive platform for cybercriminal operations. Current Discord safety initiatives, including the recent launch of the Ignore tool and participation in the ROOST (Robust Open Online Safety Tools) foundation, focus primarily on user empowerment and cross-industry collaboration. However, these measures do not directly address the technical vulnerabilities that enable invite link hijacking. Security researchers have identified multiple technical indicators organizations can use to detect and prevent these attacks. File system artifacts include creating a distinctive directory structure under `ServiceHelper` and establishing a scheduled task named "checker" that executes every five minutes. Network indicators encompass specific user-agent strings ("Dynamic WinHTTP Client/1.0") and communication patterns with known malicious domains. The malware’s persistence mechanism creates a unique mutex with the identifier `3575651c-bb47-448e-a514-22865732bbc`, which security tools can monitor to detect active infections. Additionally, the campaign’s reliance on legitimate cloud services creates opportunities for enhanced monitoring of suspicious file hosting patterns and webhook communications. ## Implications for Platform Security This campaign highlights fundamental tensions between platform usability and security in modern online ecosystems. Discord’s decision to allow vanity URL reuse serves legitimate business purposes, enabling premium subscribers to claim memorable invite codes. However, this functionality creates systemic vulnerabilities that extend beyond individual user security. The attackers’ exclusive use of legitimate services for command-and-control infrastructure represents a significant challenge for traditional security controls. By routing malicious communications through Discord webhooks, GitHub repositories, and Pastebin documents, the campaign effectively immunizes itself against domain-based blocking and reputation systems. ## Recommendations and Future Outlook Security experts recommend multiple layers of protection for both individual users and organizations. Users should avoid clicking invite links over 30 days, verify link authenticity through official channels, and never execute PowerShell commands from untrusted sources. Two-factor authentication protects high-value accounts, particularly those containing cryptocurrency assets. Organizations require more comprehensive defensive strategies, including advanced endpoint detection systems capable of monitoring for suspicious scheduled tasks and PowerShell execution patterns. Application allow listing can prevent unauthorized script execution, while network monitoring should focus on identifying suspicious communications with cloud hosting services. The campaign's ongoing evolution, including regular infrastructure updates and new payload variants, suggests threat actors will continue adapting their techniques to maintain effectiveness. The successful bypass of Chrome's App-Bound Encryption demonstrates that even cutting-edge security controls face rapid circumvention by determined adversaries. As cryptocurrency adoption continues expanding globally and gaming communities grow increasingly interconnected, the intersection of these trends creates expanding attack surfaces for financially motivated cybercriminals. The Discord invite link hijacking campaign represents not just a tactical security concern but a strategic indicator of how trusted platforms can be systematically weaponized against their own users. The persistence and sophistication of this operation underscore the critical need for platform providers to implement robust security controls that balance functionality with protection. At the same time, users and organizations must adopt comprehensive defensive strategies that account for the evolving threat landscape of legitimate service abuse.

loading..   14-Jun-2025
loading..   10 min read
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RCE

APEX ONE

Critical pre-auth RCE & auth bypass flaws in Trend Micro Apex Central & PolicySe...

Trend Micro recently patched multiple critical-severity vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49212 to CVE-2025-49220) in its Apex Central and Endpoint Encryption (TMEE) PolicyServer products. All flaws enable pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) or authentication bypass, fundamentally compromising the security posture of these enterprise management platforms. The root cause analysis reveals a pervasive pattern of insecure deserialization practices and broken authentication mechanisms, granting attackers SYSTEM (PolicyServer) or NETWORK SERVICE (Apex Central) privileges. With no evidence of active exploitation but lacking viable workarounds, immediate patching to PolicyServer v6.0.0.4013 and Apex Central Patch B7007 is operationally imperative. ### **Target Environment & Criticality** Trend Micro Endpoint Encryption (TMEE) PolicyServer and Apex Central serve as central nervous systems for enterprise security operations: * **TMEE PolicyServer:** Manages full-disk and removable media encryption for Windows endpoints in regulated industries (finance, healthcare, government). It is a high-value target because it enforces data protection compliance (e.g., HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS). * **Apex Central:** Provides centralized monitoring and management for Trend Micro security products across large networks. A compromise offers attackers extensive lateral movement potential. The discovery of **eight critical/high vulnerabilities** (four critical in PolicyServer, two critical in Apex Central, plus four high in PolicyServer) represents a systemic failure in core security controls within these essential components of infrastructure. ### **TMEE PolicyServer Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49212, -49213, -49216, -49217)** * **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Insecure Deserialization** Three of the four critical flaws stem from the unsafe deserialization of untrusted data without adequate validation or type checking. This anti-pattern allows attackers to craft malicious serialized objects that, when processed, trigger unintended code execution paths. * **[CVE-2025-49212](https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0019928)(Critical):** Exploits insecure deserialization in the `PolicyValueTableSerializationBinder` class. Attackers send a specially crafted serialized object pre-authentication, resulting in **arbitrary code execution as the SYSTEM user**. * **[CVE-2025-49213](https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0019928) (Critical):** Targets deserialization within the `PolicyServerWindowsService` class. Similar to CVE-49212, unauthenticated attackers achieve **SYSTEM-level RCE** via malicious serialized payloads. * **[CVE-2025-49217](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4217) (Critical/High\*):** Resides in the `ValidateToken` method. While exploitation complexity is marginally higher (potentially requiring specific object chaining or gadget discovery), successful attack still yields **pre-auth SYSTEM-level RCE**. (\*Note: ZDI assessed as High severity). * **Exploitation Impact:** SYSTEM privileges grant attackers complete control over the PolicyServer host, enabling decryption key theft, policy manipulation disabling encryption, installation of persistent malware, and lateral movement into managed endpoints. #### **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Broken Authentication** * **[CVE-2025-49216](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49216) (Critical):** A fundamental flaw in the `DbAppDomain` service authentication mechanism allows **complete authentication bypass**. Remote attackers can forge requests appearing as authenticated administrators, enabling full administrative control over the PolicyServer without valid credentials. This flaw facilitates stealthy persistence, policy alteration, and credential harvesting. ### **Apex Central Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49219, -49220)** * **Core Vulnerability Pattern: Insecure Deserialization (Revisited)** Both critical RCE flaws in Apex Central echo the deserialization failures seen in PolicyServer, impacting different entry points: * **[CVE-2025-49219](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49219) (Critical, CVSS 9.8):** Exploits insecure deserialization within the `GetReportDetailView` method. Unauthenticated attackers achieve **RCE in the context of the NETWORK SERVICE account**. * **[CVE-2025-49220](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49220) (Critical, CVSS 9.8):** Leverages improper input validation during deserialization in the `ConvertFromJson` method. Pre-authentication exploitation leads to **arbitrary code execution as NETWORK SERVICE**. * **Exploitation Impact:** While NETWORK SERVICE has fewer inherent privileges than SYSTEM, compromise provides a potent beachhead within the security management infrastructure. Attackers gain access to sensitive monitoring data, agent configurations, and the ability to push malicious updates or commands to all managed security products (AV, EDR, etc.). ### **Additional Risks & Patch Scope** * **PolicyServer High-Severity Flaws:** The update also addresses four high-severity vulnerabilities, including SQL injection and privilege escalation paths. While not enabling direct pre-auth RCE, these flaws significantly lower the barrier for post-compromise persistence and data exfiltration. * **Universal Impact & Mitigation Absence:** All documented vulnerabilities impact **all prior versions** of the respective products up to the immediate predecessor of the patched release. Critically, Trend Micro confirms **no viable workarounds or mitigations exist** besides patching. * **Trend Micro Endpoint Encryption PolicyServer:** Install version **6.0.0.4013 (Patch 1 Update 6)**. * **Trend Micro Apex Central:** * **On-Premise (2019):** Apply **Patch B7007**. * **Apex Central as a Service:** Patches are applied automatically on the backend; no customer action required (verification recommended). While Trend Micro reports no active exploitation in the wild (as of June 2025), the nature of these vulnerabilities creates a desirable target for advanced threat actors: * **Pre-Authentication Exploitation:** Eliminates the need for credential theft or phishing. * **High Privileges:** SYSTEM (PolicyServer) provides maximum control; NETWORK SERVICE (Apex Central) offers broad access. * **Critical Product Function:** Compromise grants control over encryption enforcement (PolicyServer) or enterprise-wide security management (Apex Central). * **POC Availability:** Vulnerabilities of this nature (insecure deserialization) often see rapid Proof-of-Concept (PoC) development once details are public. The ZDI disclosure (noting the severity difference for CVE-49217) signals researcher attention. The cluster of vulnerabilities in Trend Micro's Apex Central and TMEE PolicyServer represents a severe systemic risk to organizations relying on these products for critical security and compliance functions. The recurring theme of **insecure deserialization** highlights a fundamental weakness in input validation and object processing pipelines, while the **authentication bypass** (CVE-49216) indicates critical flaws in access control implementation. **Immediate Actions:** 1. **Patch Urgently:** Apply PolicyServer v6.0.0.4013 and Apex Central Patch B7007 (On-Prem) immediately. Verify automatic patching for Apex Central SaaS. 2. **Inventory & Scan:** Identify all instances of Apex Central and TMEE PolicyServer within the enterprise. Conduct vulnerability scans confirming patch levels. 3. **Monitor Logs:** Aggressively monitor authentication logs, service execution logs, and network traffic to/from these servers for anomalous activity (especially pre-auth RCE attempts or unexpected administrative actions). 4. **Defense-in-Depth:** Enforce strict network segmentation, limiting access to management interfaces only to absolutely necessary administrative networks/hosts. Implement robust EDR/NDR solutions to detect post-exploitation activities. The absence of workarounds underscores the criticality of patching. Organizations in regulated sectors face not only operational disruption but also significant compliance and reputational risks if these central security management platforms are compromised. These vulnerabilities transform the very tools designed to protect the enterprise into potent vectors for its compromise.

loading..   13-Jun-2025
loading..   6 min read
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Snowflake

Shinyhunter

Arkana Security listed 569GB of "new" Ticketmaster data? Our deep dive reveals i...

Over the past weekend, the cybersecurity landscape buzzed with alarming reports: the relatively new extortion outfit, **Arkana Security**, brazenly listed over **569 GB of allegedly fresh Ticketmaster data** for sale on its dark web leak site. Screenshots flaunting databases and file directories fueled immediate speculation of a devastating *new* breach impacting the world's largest ticketing platform. However, this analysis has pierced this facade, revealing a calculated deception. The data isn’t new; it’s a cynical **repackage of the massive cache stolen during the widespread 2024 Snowflake credential compromise attacks**, originally orchestrated by the notorious **ShinyHunters** group. ### **Deconstructing Arkana's Claim** 1. **Initial Posting:** Arkana Security promoted the Ticketmaster data dump, implying recent exfiltration. The sheer volume (569 GB) suggested a significant compromise, triggering urgent inquiries and media alerts. 2. **Smoking Gun - "RapeFlaked":** Crucially, one image accompanying Arkana's listing bore the damning caption: **"rapeflaked copy 4 quick sale 1 buyer."** This term is not generic hacker slang; it's a direct reference to **"RapeFlake"** – a **custom malicious tool** specifically developed and deployed by the threat actors behind the Snowflake attacks. RapeFlake's purpose was reconnaissance and data exfiltration from Snowflake customer instances using stolen credentials. 3. **Digital Fingerprint Match:** Security researchers conducted a meticulous comparison. The **file names, structures, and samples** showcased by Arkana **precisely matched** data samples they had previously analyzed and confirmed as originating from the **Ticketmaster breach via Snowflake**, disclosed and confirmed by the company in late May 2024. This digital fingerprint is undeniable evidence of origin. ### **Revisiting the Snowflake Onslaught** The **2024 Snowflake credential theft campaign** stands as one of the most significant supply-chain-style attacks of the year: * **Method:** Attackers leveraged credentials stolen by **infostealer malware** (like Vidar, Risepro, Lumma, etc.) from infected employee devices. These credentials provided direct access to Snowflake customer accounts *without* exploiting vulnerabilities in Snowflake itself. * **Perpetrator:** The campaign was widely claimed and executed by **ShinyHunters**, a prolific and aggressive extortion group with a long history of high-profile breaches. * **Victims:** Beyond Ticketmaster, confirmed victims included **Santander Bank, AT&T, Advance Auto Parts, Neiman Marcus, Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), Pure Storage, and Cylance (a subsidiary of BlackBerry)** – demonstrating the attack's massive breadth. * **Ticketmaster's Ordeal:** Ticketmaster became a prime ShinyHunters target. After the initial Snowflake compromise, the group escalated extortion by leaking samples, even claiming to release print-at-home tickets, including highly sought-after **Taylor Swift tickets**, on hacking forums. Ticketmaster officially confirmed the breach stemming from the Snowflake incident in late May. ### **Arkana's Play: Opportunism, Recycling, and Uncertainty** Arkana Security's actions represent a concerning trend in the cybercrime ecosystem: 1. **Data Recycling for Profit:** Instead of conducting a new breach, Arkana is attempting to **monetize previously stolen data**. This could be because: * They purchased the data from ShinyHunters or a middleman. * They are a splinter group or affiliates with access to the original haul. * They simply obtained a copy circulating in underground markets. 2. **Creating Illusion for Leverage:** By presenting old data as new ("quick sale"), Arkana aims to: * Generate fresh panic and media attention. * Apply renewed pressure on Ticketmaster. * Attract a buyer willing to pay for what they mistakenly believe is exclusive, newly compromised information. 3. **ShinyHunters Connection? Murky Waters:** The direct link between Arkana and ShinyHunters remains unclear: * **Collaboration?** Are they working together to maximize extortion pressure or reach different buyer pools? * **Resellers?** Is Arkana purely a downstream distributor? * **Rebranding/Splintering?** Given ShinyHunters' history of arrests (see below), is Arkana a new face for old actors? * The shared reference to RapeFlake strongly suggests *some* level of connection or access to the original attackers' tools and narratives. ### **ShinyHunters Shadow** Understanding ShinyHunters is key to contextualizing this event: * **Prolific Track Record:** Responsible for countless breaches, including the monumental **PowerSchool compromise** affecting **62.4 million students and 9.5 million teachers** across 6,505 school districts globally. * **Evolving Tactics:** Recently linked by Mandiant to campaigns targeting **Salesforce accounts**, stealing customer data for extortion. * **Identity Crisis:** Law enforcement has scored significant victories: * Sebastien Raoult ("Sezyo Kaizen") sentenced to 3 years and a $5m restitution order (2023). * Multiple alleged members arrested in France and Australia (Operation TOURNIQUET, 2024). * This raises a critical question: Is the *current* ShinyHunters activity the original group, remnants, or entirely new actors cynically adopting the infamous brand to confuse law enforcement and capitalize on its notoriety? Adding intrigue, Arkana Security **removed the Ticketmaster data listing from their leak site on June 9th**. Possible reasons include: * Securing a buyer in their desired "quick sale." * Negative attention from researchers/media debunking the "new breach" claim. * Pressure from law enforcement or other threat actors. * Internal group decisions.

loading..   10-Jun-2025
loading..   4 min read