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Moncler

BlackCat

AlphaV

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Moncler group becomes the first victim of ALPHV (BlackCat) RaaS following the data leak

Moncler group hit by a ransomware attack resulting in data leak due to the failure of $3M worth of Bitcoin or Monero ransom demand...

21-Jan-2022
3 min read

No content available.

Related Articles

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DNA

Genetics

23andMe files Ch.11 bankruptcy, asset sale risks 15M users' DNA data. Urgent pri...

23andMe, the pioneering genetic testing company that brought DNA analysis to millions of living rooms, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Sunday, capping years of financial turbulence. The move triggers a high-stakes auction of its assets—including one of the world’s largest troves of consumer genetic data—raising urgent questions about the fate of sensitive health and ancestry information belonging to 15 million users. ### **What Chapter 11 Means for Your DNA** Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows companies to restructure debts while continuing operations, but 23andMe’s decision to sell its assets complicates the process. Under U.S. law, customer data is classified as a corporate asset unless explicitly protected. While 23andMe claims genetic information will remain secure, privacy experts warn that new owners could exploit loopholes to monetize or mishandle data. The company [rejected](https://investors.23andme.com/news-releases/news-release-details/23andme-initiates-voluntary-chapter-11-process-maximize) a bid from co-founder and outgoing CEO Anne Wojcicki, who resigned to participate as an independent bidder. _“The board determined a competitive auction maximizes value for stakeholders,”_ said Chair Mark Jensen in a statement. ### **A History of Breaches and Broken Trust** The bankruptcy filing follows a catastrophic year for 23andMe’s reputation. In 2023, hackers accessed 6.4 million user profiles via credential-stuffing attacks, stealing ancestry reports, health predispositions, and family tree links. The breach exposed raw genotype data—a digital blueprint of users’ DNA—which cybersecurity firm HackMitigation called “a goldmine for foreign actors or insurance fraud.” **Samantha Cole, a 32-year-old breach victim**, told, _“I trusted them with my most personal information. Now I’m terrified it could end up in the hands of some hedge fund or worse.”_ 23andMe settled a class-action lawsuit for $30 million in September 2024 but faces ongoing scrutiny. Critics slammed the company for quietly amending its Terms of Use post-breach to force disputes into arbitration, a move Consumer Advocacy Group CEO Laura Chen called _“a betrayal of users’ rights.” _ ### **Regulators Sound the Alarm** **California Attorney General Rob Bonta** issued an urgent consumer alert Monday, urging users to delete data and revoke research permissions. _“Your DNA isn’t just yours—it’s your family’s. Take action now,”_ the alert stated, providing step-by-step deletion instructions (*see graphic*). **In the UK**, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) warned that GDPR rules still bind 23andMe, requiring _“explicit consent”_ for data transfers. _“Genetic information is uniquely identifiable and immutable. Its exposure could have lifelong consequences,”_ said ICO Deputy Commissioner Stephen Bonner. ### **How to Protect Your Data** 1. **Delete Your Profile**: - Log into 23andMe → Settings → *Permanently Delete Data* → Confirm via email. - **Note**: Deletion may take 30 days. 2. **Destroy Your Sample**: - Email requests@23andme.com to demand destruction of stored saliva samples. 3. **Opt Out of Research**: - Navigate to *Privacy Preferences* → Toggle off “Consent to Research.” *[Infographic Suggestion: Embed a visual guide to data deletion with screenshots.]* ### **Who Owns Your Genes?** The crisis spotlights a gap in U.S. biometric privacy laws. Unlike the EU’s GDPR, which treats genetic data as “sensitive” and restricts its sale, U.S. regulations lack explicit safeguards for DNA. _“This isn’t a spreadsheet leak—this is your biological code,”_ said Dr. Alicia Torres, a bioethicist at MIT. _“Companies treat DNA like a commodity, but morally, it should belong solely to the individual.”_

loading..   29-Mar-2025
loading..   3 min read
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NPM

Sophisticated npm Attack Infects Legitimate Packages with Persistent Reverse She...

Researchers at Reversing Labs have identified a troubling trend in software supply chain security: two malicious npm packages—*ethers-provider2* and *ethers-providerz*—that stealthily compromise legitimate Ethereum development tools by installing a persistent reverse shell backdoor. This insidious method ensures that the backdoor remains operational even after the malicious packages are removed, underscoring a serious threat to the open-source ecosystem. This finding highlights the vulnerability inherent in developer workflows dependent on public repositories like npm, as even packages with minimal download counts can pose significant systemic risks. ### **Discovery and Tactical Breakdown** The campaign, detected during routine supply chain security audits, leverages *typosquatting*—a technique where attackers mimic popular package names—to target developers using the *ethers.js* library, a cornerstone of Ethereum blockchain interactions. Both malicious packages masquerade as legitimate ethers.js dependencies but execute a multi-stage attack: 1. **Stage 1: Malicious Install Scripts** Upon installation, *ethers-provider2* triggers a modified `install.js` script to fetch a second-stage payload from a remote server. The payload executes immediately and self-deletes to erase forensic traces. 2. **Stage 2: Legitimate Package Hijacking** The second payload scans for installations of the authentic *ethers* or *@ethersproject/providers* packages. Once identified, it replaces the legitimate `provider-jsonrpc.js` file with a trojanized version. 3. **Stage 3: Reverse Shell Activation** The injected code retrieves a final payload enabling a reverse shell connection to the attacker’s IP (`5.199.166.1:31337`). This backdoor, built on a modified `ssh2` client, mimics legitimate SSH traffic to evade detection, granting attackers persistent remote access. *_“The malware’s layered obfuscation and self-destruct mechanisms make forensic analysis exceptionally challenging,”_* Reversing Labs noted in a technical advisory. ### **Persistence Supply Chain Attacks** Unlike conventional malware that depends on the presence of malicious packages, this campaign embeds itself into trusted dependencies. Even if developers remove *ethers-provider2* or *ethers-providerz*, the compromised ethers.js files retain the backdoor. *_“This persistence mechanism is a nightmare scenario,”* emphasized a Reversing Labs spokesperson. *“Attackers no longer need their malware to stay installed. They’ve found a way to ‘burn’ their payload into widely used tools, making remediation a manual, labor-intensive process.”_* ### **Attacker Missteps** Researchers identified two additional packages—*reproduction-hardhat* and *@theoretical123/providers*—linked to the same infrastructure. Notably, early versions of *ethers-providerz* contained path errors that crippled their functionality, prompting the author to withdraw the package temporarily. Reversing Labs warns the threat actor may re-release a patched version, heightening the need for vigilance. ### **Current Status and Mitigation** As of publication, *ethers-provider2* remains downloadable from npm, though its second-stage payload server is offline, potentially neutralizing active infections. Reversing Labs has shared a YARA rule to help organizations detect remnants of the attack. ### **Recommendations for Developers:** 1. **Scan Environments**: Deploy the provided YARA rule to identify injected code. 2. **Audit Dependencies**: Manually inspect `provider-jsonrpc.js` and related files for unauthorized modifications. 3. **Monitor Network Activity**: Flag outgoing connections to `5.199.166.1:31337` or unusual SSH traffic. 4. **Enforce Integrity Checks**: Use tools like npm’s `lockfile` or cryptographic hashing to verify package authenticity.

loading..   26-Mar-2025
loading..   3 min read
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SSO

Data Leak

Oracle refutes claims of a breach by threat actor rose87168, who alleges selling...

Tech giant Oracle has vehemently denied a data breach after a threat actor, operating under the alias *rose87168*, claimed to infiltrate Oracle Cloud’s federated SSO login servers. The actor allegedly sells 6 million records—including encrypted passwords, Java Keystore (JKS) files, and LDAP data—on the hacking forum BreachForums. In a publicly announced statement, Oracle asserted, _“There has been no breach of Oracle Cloud. The published credentials are not for the Oracle Cloud. No customers experienced a breach or lost data.”_ This rebuttal follows rose87168’s release of sample data and a URL purportedly proving access to Oracle’s `login.us2.oraclecloud.com` server. ### **Timeline of the Alleged Oracle Cloud SSO Breach** 1. **Initial Compromise**: The threat actor claims to have breached Oracle Cloud servers **40 days ago**, exfiltrating data from the US2 and EM2 regions. 2. **Extortion Attempt**: Rose87168 emailed Oracle demanding **100,000 XMR (Monero)**—a privacy-focused cryptocurrency—in exchange for breach details. Oracle reportedly declined, requesting “all information needed for a patch” instead. 3. **Data Sale**: On BreachForums, the actor advertised the sale of encrypted SSO passwords, LDAP hashes, and enterprise manager keys, offering companies a “pay-to-delete” option to remove their data pre-sale. ### **Technical Analysis of the Alleged Oracle Cloud Vulnerability** Rose87168 alleges exploiting a **critical unpatched CVE** (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) in Oracle Cloud servers. While the actor claims the flaw lacks a public PoC (Proof of Concept), Oracle has not confirmed the vulnerability’s existence. Key technical points include: - **Encrypted SSO Passwords**: Advertised as decryptable using stolen JKS and key files. - **LDAP Hashes**: Marketed as “crackable” with sufficient computational resources. - **Proof of Access**: A text file uploaded to Oracle’s `login.us2.oraclecloud.com` server, archived on the Internet Archive, was shared as evidence. ### **Oracle’s Response & Counterclaims** Oracle has maintained a firm stance against the breach allegations: - **Denial of Server Access**: The company insists that rose87168’s proof-of-concept URL does not validate access to Oracle Cloud infrastructure. - **Customer Reassurance**: Emphasizing no customer data loss, Oracle dismissed the leaked credentials as unrelated to its cloud services. - **Call for Evidence**: Oracle’s request for full vulnerability details before payment suggests strategic stalling to assess the threat actor’s legitimacy. ### **Extortion Tactics** The threat actor’s campaign employs psychological manipulation to pressure Oracle and its clients: - Highlighting “crackable” passwords and LDAP hashes instills urgency among affected companies. - The “pay-to-delete” scheme preys on organizations’ desire to avoid public scrutiny. - Rose87168 invited hackers to assist in cracking passwords, leveraging collective expertise to escalate the threat.

loading..   24-Mar-2025
loading..   3 min read