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Data Leak

SSO

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Oracle Denies Cloud SSO Breach as Threat Actor Rose87168 Claims Sale of 6 Million Records

Oracle refutes claims of a breach by threat actor rose87168, who alleges selling 6 million Oracle Cloud SSO records. Explore the technical details, extortion ta...

24-Mar-2025
3 min read

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Related Articles

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NPM

Sophisticated npm Attack Infects Legitimate Packages with Persistent Reverse She...

Researchers at Reversing Labs have identified a troubling trend in software supply chain security: two malicious npm packages—*ethers-provider2* and *ethers-providerz*—that stealthily compromise legitimate Ethereum development tools by installing a persistent reverse shell backdoor. This insidious method ensures that the backdoor remains operational even after the malicious packages are removed, underscoring a serious threat to the open-source ecosystem. This finding highlights the vulnerability inherent in developer workflows dependent on public repositories like npm, as even packages with minimal download counts can pose significant systemic risks. ### **Discovery and Tactical Breakdown** The campaign, detected during routine supply chain security audits, leverages *typosquatting*—a technique where attackers mimic popular package names—to target developers using the *ethers.js* library, a cornerstone of Ethereum blockchain interactions. Both malicious packages masquerade as legitimate ethers.js dependencies but execute a multi-stage attack: 1. **Stage 1: Malicious Install Scripts** Upon installation, *ethers-provider2* triggers a modified `install.js` script to fetch a second-stage payload from a remote server. The payload executes immediately and self-deletes to erase forensic traces. 2. **Stage 2: Legitimate Package Hijacking** The second payload scans for installations of the authentic *ethers* or *@ethersproject/providers* packages. Once identified, it replaces the legitimate `provider-jsonrpc.js` file with a trojanized version. 3. **Stage 3: Reverse Shell Activation** The injected code retrieves a final payload enabling a reverse shell connection to the attacker’s IP (`5.199.166.1:31337`). This backdoor, built on a modified `ssh2` client, mimics legitimate SSH traffic to evade detection, granting attackers persistent remote access. *_“The malware’s layered obfuscation and self-destruct mechanisms make forensic analysis exceptionally challenging,”_* Reversing Labs noted in a technical advisory. ### **Persistence Supply Chain Attacks** Unlike conventional malware that depends on the presence of malicious packages, this campaign embeds itself into trusted dependencies. Even if developers remove *ethers-provider2* or *ethers-providerz*, the compromised ethers.js files retain the backdoor. *_“This persistence mechanism is a nightmare scenario,”* emphasized a Reversing Labs spokesperson. *“Attackers no longer need their malware to stay installed. They’ve found a way to ‘burn’ their payload into widely used tools, making remediation a manual, labor-intensive process.”_* ### **Attacker Missteps** Researchers identified two additional packages—*reproduction-hardhat* and *@theoretical123/providers*—linked to the same infrastructure. Notably, early versions of *ethers-providerz* contained path errors that crippled their functionality, prompting the author to withdraw the package temporarily. Reversing Labs warns the threat actor may re-release a patched version, heightening the need for vigilance. ### **Current Status and Mitigation** As of publication, *ethers-provider2* remains downloadable from npm, though its second-stage payload server is offline, potentially neutralizing active infections. Reversing Labs has shared a YARA rule to help organizations detect remnants of the attack. ### **Recommendations for Developers:** 1. **Scan Environments**: Deploy the provided YARA rule to identify injected code. 2. **Audit Dependencies**: Manually inspect `provider-jsonrpc.js` and related files for unauthorized modifications. 3. **Monitor Network Activity**: Flag outgoing connections to `5.199.166.1:31337` or unusual SSH traffic. 4. **Enforce Integrity Checks**: Use tools like npm’s `lockfile` or cryptographic hashing to verify package authenticity.

loading..   26-Mar-2025
loading..   3 min read
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RaaS

VanHelsing

VanHelsing RaaS 2025: $5k Cyber Threat Targets Windows, Linux, ESXi. Double Exto...

A new emerging ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, dubbed *VanHelsing*, has rapidly escalated cybersecurity concerns globally after compromising three high-profile victims within weeks of its launch on 7 March 2025. Security researchers at Check Point warn that the group’s sophisticated tools, affiliate-driven model, and cross-platform capabilities position it as a formidable threat to businesses and governments. The emergence of VanHelsing coincides with a broader surge in ransomware attacks, with February 2025 marking the worst month in history for such incidents, according to cybersecurity firm Bitdefender. VanHelsing’s RaaS model democratizes cybercrime by allowing seasoned hackers and newcomers to participate for a $5,000 deposit, which is waived for affiliates with proven reputations. Affiliates retain 80% of ransom payments, while the operators pocket 20%, incentivizing rapid adoption. The group explicitly prohibits attacks on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a common tactic among cybercriminal syndicates to avoid retaliation from Russia-aligned hacking collectives. Check Point’s report highlights VanHelsing’s “user-friendly” control panel, which supports desktop and mobile devices—even featuring dark mode—and enables affiliates to target Windows, Linux, BSD, Arm, and ESXi systems. The ransomware employs a double extortion strategy, stealing sensitive data before encrypting files and appending the “.vanhelsing” extension. Victims receive a ransom note demanding Bitcoin payments, while their desktop wallpapers are altered to amplify psychological pressure. The C++-based malware also deletes shadow copies to hinder system recovery. It uses command-line arguments to customize attacks, such as spreading to SMB servers or operating in “Silent” mode to delay file renaming. CYFIRMA reports that government agencies, pharmaceutical firms, and manufacturers in France and the U.S. have fallen prey to the group. ### **Cross-Platform Attacks & Exploited Vulnerabilities** VanHelsing’s rise mirrors a broader shift in ransomware tactics. New variants of *Albabat* ransomware now target Linux and macOS systems. In contrast, *BlackLock*—a rebranded version of the notorious Eldorado ransomware—has become one of 2025’s most active RaaS groups, focusing on technology, finance, and retail sectors. BlackLock recruits “traffers” to deploy malicious pages that infect victims with malware, enabling initial access for follow-up attacks. Meanwhile, the *SocGholish* framework (aka FakeUpdates) is being leveraged to distribute *RansomHub* ransomware, attributed to the threat group Water Scylla. Critical vulnerabilities in Fortinet firewall appliances (CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472) are also being exploited by a threat actor known as *Mora_001* to deploy *SuperBlack*, a modified version of LockBit 3.0 equipped with custom data exfiltration tools. Simultaneously, the *Babuk2* group is recycling data from past breaches linked to RansomHub and LockBit to issue fake extortion demands, capitalizing on victims’ fears of reputational damage. ### **Remote Encryption & Record-Breaking Attacks** Bitdefender’s data reveals ransomware hit a historic peak in February 2025, with 962 victims publicly listed—a 126% increase from February 2024. The Cl0p RaaS group alone claimed 335 victims, underscoring the scalability of the RaaS ecosystem. Sophos reports a 50% year-over-year surge in remote encryption attacks, where hackers compromise unmanaged devices to encrypt data on domain-joined networks. This trend reflects attackers’ growing focus on exploiting visibility gaps, with remote encryption incidents rising 141% since 2022. _“Remote encryption is now a standard tool for ransomware groups,”_ said Chester Wisniewski, Sophos’ Global Field CISO. “Cybercriminals are aggressively targeting blind spots in corporate networks, often using unsecured endpoints as entry points. Organisations must prioritise comprehensive monitoring to detect suspicious file activity before it escalates.” ### **Mitigation Strategies for Businesses** Experts urge organizations to adopt proactive defences, including patching known vulnerabilities like those in Fortinet appliances, enforcing network segmentation, and maintaining offline backups. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are critical for identifying anomalies, particularly in SMB traffic and remote encryption attempts. Employee training to recognize phishing and social engineering tactics remains vital, as groups like BlackLock increasingly rely on “traffers” to lure victims. The importance of threat intelligence sharing has been recognised. Businesses are advised to monitor for indicators of compromise (IoCs) such as the “.vanhelsing” extension, Bitcoin wallet addresses linked to VanHelsing, and unexpected desktop wallpaper changes. Collaboration with cybersecurity firms and government agencies is also recommended to stay ahead of evolving tactics. As ransomware groups refine their strategies—prioritising cross-platform compatibility, rebranding, and exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities—the VanHelsing operation exemplifies the growing sophistication of cybercrime. With frequent updates and a polished interface, VanHelsing is poised to attract more affiliates, amplifying its global impact. For businesses, the stakes have never been higher: holistic visibility, zero-trust frameworks, and rapid incident response are no longer optional but essential to surviving the ransomware era.

loading..   24-Mar-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Access Token

Over 20,000 projects affected as Coinbase becomes the main target in a sophistic...

A sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the code-sharing platform [GitHub](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/fake-po-c-repositories-and-malicious-code-on-git-hub). Researchers from Palo Alto Unit 42 and Wiz have unveiled a detailed investigation into a multi-phase breach involving [Coinbase](https://www.secureblink.com/cyber-security-news/coinbase-phishing-scam-exploits-trust-in-email-infrastructure-to-hijack-crypto-wallets) as a primary target. ### **Targeting GitHub Actions** GitHub Actions, an automation tool commonly used for Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD), became the focus of a large-scale, cascading supply chain attack earlier this month. Researchers have pinpointed that Coinbase, one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges, was among the earliest victims despite claims of no significant damage to its assets. The attack began when malicious code was stealthily injected into the widely-used GitHub Action known as `reviewdog/action-setup@v1`. This action is commonly utilized to automate processes like linting and code review during the development lifecycle. Though the specific method of how the breach occurred remains unclear, its ramifications were far-reaching. ### **A Carefully Orchestrated Infiltration** The malicious code was introduced into `reviewdog/action-setup@v1` in such a way that whenever other GitHub Actions—such as `tj-actions/eslint-changed-files`—called this action, it would cause sensitive secrets and authentication tokens to be dumped into the GitHub Actions logs. For developers and organizations relying on these tools, this posed a severe risk, as those logs contained critical CI/CD secrets. As the breach advanced, attackers used this method to steal a *Personal Access Token* (PAT) from an unsuspecting repository, which was then exploited to push a malicious commit to `tj-actions/changed-files`. This action was part of the malicious chain that targeted Coinbase specifically, along with a user account named *"mmvojwip"*, which was later identified as belonging to the attacker. ### **Targeted Commit and Token Theft** The malicious commit was strategically crafted to target Coinbase’s highly sensitive projects, including `coinbase/agentkit`, a pivotal framework that facilitates interaction between AI agents and blockchain networks. Over 20,000 other projects used the same `tj-actions/changed-files` GitHub Action, increasing the scope of the potential damage. However, it was the timing and execution against Coinbase that highlighted the precision of the attack. On 14 March 2025, just two hours before the main phase of the attack against `tj-actions/changed-files`, the attackers had successfully stolen a GitHub token with *write permissions* to the `coinbase/agentkit` repository. This token, a critical access point, could have enabled them to significantly alter the project. ### **Attack Neutralized** Despite the alarming nature of the breach, Coinbase confirmed through discussions with Palo Alto’s Unit 42 that the attackers were ultimately unsuccessful in causing any tangible damage. The company issued a statement asserting that no assets or code from the `agentkit` project or any other Coinbase resource had been compromised. _“We followed up by sharing more details of our findings with Coinbase, which stated that the attack was unsuccessful at causing any damage to the agentkit project, or any other Coinbase asset,”_ said Unit 42 in their report. The swift action from CoinbaseCoinbase's swift action, coupled with an effective response to mitigate further damage, ensured that the potential for widespread disruption was contained. While Coinbase’s prompt response helped limit the immediate impact, this attack underscores a growing concern over supply chain vulnerabilities in software development. With an increasing number of organizations relying on open-source GitHub Actions, a dependency chain like this presents a ripe opportunity for threat actors. Palo Alto Unit 42 and Wiz’s analysis revealed that while Coinbase was the primary focus, the cascading nature of the attack means it could have been far more widespread. It’s critical for organizations to reevaluate their security protocols, ensuring that actions such as code review and continuous integration are secure, both in terms of the tools they use and the repositories they manage.

loading..   22-Mar-2025
loading..   4 min read