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WHD

EDR

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Unpatched Web Help Desk instances remain vulnerable to external attempts of attacks

SolarWinds warned of internet-facing WHD instances 12.7.5 found to be vulnerable against external attempted attacks...

22-Mar-2022
2 min read

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RHYSIDA

Port of Seattle ransomware attack by Rhysida exposed 90K individuals' data. No r...

The Port of Seattle, a critical hub for maritime and aviation operations in the Pacific Northwest, disclosed this week that a **ransomware attack** in August 2024 compromised the personal data of approximately **90,000 individuals**, including current and former employees, contractors, and parking system users. The breach, attributed to the **Rhysida ransomware group**, marks one of the most significant cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure in recent years and underscores growing vulnerabilities in legacy public-sector systems. ### **Attack Timeline** On **August 24, 2024**, Port officials detected unusual system outages consistent with a cyber intrusion. The Rhysida group, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since May 2023, encrypted portions of the Port’s network and exfiltrated sensitive data. While the attack disrupted key airport systems—including baggage handling, flight information displays, and the Port’s public website—officials confirmed that **no safety systems** at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) or maritime facilities were compromised. Federal partners, including the TSA and FAA, also remained unaffected. By **September 13, 2024**, the Port publicly named Rhysida as the perpetrator and revealed it had refused to pay the ransom. “Paying criminal organizations contradicts our values and stewardship of public funds,” said Port Executive Director **Steve Metruck**. The group later leaked snippets of stolen data on its dark web site, including employee Social Security numbers and medical records. ### **Data Breach Scope: What Was Stolen?** Forensic investigations confirmed attackers accessed: - **Full names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers** (either complete or last four digits). - **Driver’s license or government ID numbers**. - **Limited medical information** (specifics undisclosed for privacy reasons). **Notably spared**: Payment systems, passenger travel data, and federal agency networks. The Port emphasized it retains “very little” passenger information, a factor that likely limited the breach’s scope. ### **Operational Chaos and Recovery Efforts** The attack caused **weeks of operational disruptions** at SEA Airport during peak Labor Day travel: - **Baggage systems**: Manual processes delayed luggage handling. - **Flight displays**: Volunteers replaced digital boards with handwritten signs. - **Wi-Fi and apps**: Critical tools like the flySEA app went offline. By early September, most systems were restored, though the Port’s website remained partially offline until November 2024. “Our teams worked tirelessly to ensure travelers reached their destinations safely,” said Metruck, noting that **4,000+ staff hours** were dedicated to recovery. ### **Why the Port Refused to Pay** The decision to reject Rhysida’s ransom demand aligns with **FBI and CISA advisories** discouraging payments to cybercriminals. However, it came with risks. “Refusing to pay often escalates the threat of data leaks,” said **Dr. Elena Torres**, a ransomware analyst at the University of Washington. “But capitulating funds future attacks and rarely guarantees data recovery.” Rhysida, known for high-profile breaches like the **British Library** and **Sony’s Insomniac Games**, has leveraged double-extortion tactics since 2023. The group’s dark web auction of Port data—a common strategy to pressure victims—yielded limited traction, according to cybersecurity firm **DarkFeed**. ### **Broader Implications for Critical Infrastructure** The breach highlights systemic risks in aging IT systems used by public agencies. “Legacy systems are low-hanging fruit for attackers,” said **Michael Chen**, CTO of cybersecurity firm **ShieldWall**. “The Port’s recovery shows resilience, but this should be a wake-up call for infrastructure modernization.” The Port has since implemented **enhanced security measures**, including multi-factor authentication (MFA) and network segmentation. Congress is also reviewing the incident as part of ongoing hearings on **national cybersecurity readiness**. --- ### **Expert Reactions and Legal Fallout** - **Legal perspective**: Washington State’s **Consumer Protection Act** mandates breach notifications within 30 days of discovery. The Port’s 7-month delay—attributed to forensic complexity—could invite scrutiny. - **Cybersecurity community**: Critics argue the Port’s transparency, while commendable, came too late. “Proactive communication builds public trust during crises,” said **Sarah Lim**, director of the **Center for Digital Resilience**. --- ### **What’s Next for the Port of Seattle?** The Port plans to invest **$15 million** in cybersecurity upgrades over the next two years, focusing on AI-driven threat detection and employee training. “We’re committed to leading in security, not just recovering,” Metruck affirmed. For now, travelers at SEA Airport face no lingering disruptions—a testament to the Port’s operational recovery. But the human toll of the breach lingers, with impacted individuals urged to remain vigilant for years.

loading..   05-Apr-2025
loading..   4 min read
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ClickFake

Lazarus

Lazarus group intensifies its attacks with the ClickFake Interview campaign, tar...

The Lazarus Group, a state-sponsored threat actor linked to North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), has long targeted the cryptocurrency industry to fund its regime. Recent findings from Sekoia's Threat Detection and Response (TDR) investigations have revealed a new campaign, "ClickFake Interview," which uses fake job interview websites to deploy sophisticated malware, namely **GolangGhost** and **FrostyFerret**. This article unpacks the entire campaign, its technical methodologies, and how it marks a significant evolution in Lazarus' tactics. ### **A Persistent Threat to Cryptocurrencies** #### **Who is Lazarus?** Lazarus is one of the most notorious cyber threat groups globally, attributed to North Korea’s intelligence apparatus. The group has been active since at least 2009, specializing in espionage, financial theft, and cyber warfare, focusing on the cryptocurrency ecosystem since 2017. Lazarus uses cybercrime to bypass international sanctions, supporting North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. #### **Lazarus and Cryptocurrency** Lazarus' shift toward cryptocurrency theft has been well-documented. In 2024 alone, the group was responsible for over $1.3 billion in stolen funds from cryptocurrency platforms, marking a drastic increase in its targeting of centralized financial platforms (CeFi) over decentralized finance (DeFi). This trend signifies Lazarus’ evolving tactics and expanding focus. ### **ClickFake Interview** #### **Emergence of ClickFake Interview** In 2025, Sekoia’s TDR team identified **ClickFake Interview**, a sophisticated campaign by Lazarus that targets job seekers in the cryptocurrency industry. Lazarus deploys malware that facilitates remote access and data exfiltration by exploiting fake job interview websites. ##### **Comparison with Previous Campaigns** Before ClickFake Interview, Lazarus operated under campaigns like **Contagious Interview** and **Operation Dream Job**, targeting software developers and engineers through fake job offers. While these campaigns used similar social engineering tactics, ClickFake Interview leverages a more refined attack method, with distinct technical differences. ### **How the ClickFake Interview Campaign Works** #### **Fake Job Interview Websites** The ClickFake Interview campaign begins with the targeting of individuals via social media, where they are invited to participate in a job interview through a fake website. These websites mimic legitimate job platforms and use **ReactJS** to dynamically load interview content, creating the illusion of a professional recruitment process. #### **Steps in the Attack Process** 1. **Job Application Process**: - The victim fills out a contact form and answers cryptocurrency-related questions. - The victim is prompted to record an introductory video using their webcam. 2. **Camera Access Exploit: The ClickFix Tactic** - When the victim attempts to use their camera, an error message directs them to download specific drivers to resolve the issue. - The **ClickFix tactic** is employed here, where the victim is tricked into running malicious scripts under the guise of a camera driver update. ##### **The Infection Chains for Different Operating Systems** - **Windows**: A VBS script downloads and executes a **NodeJS**-based GolangGhost backdoor. - **macOS**: A Bash script downloads and extracts malicious components, including **FrostyFerret**, which steals system passwords before deploying **GolangGhost**. ### **GolangGhost Backdoor: A Multi-Platform Threat** #### **What is GolangGhost?** **GolangGhost** is an interpreted Go-based backdoor used by Lazarus for remote control and data theft. It can exfiltrate browsing data, including credentials and cryptocurrency wallets. GolangGhost supports a variety of commands, such as uploading and downloading files, executing shell commands, and gathering Chrome browser data. #### **How GolangGhost Works** - **Windows Infection**: GolangGhost is installed via a batch file that launches a decoy progress bar before executing the final backdoor payload. The malware communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server to receive further instructions. - **macOS Infection**: On macOS, the malware is delivered through a shell script that downloads a ZIP archive and runs **GolangGhost** alongside **FrostyFerret**, which helps steal the system password and browse information. ### **A Key Component in the Infection Chain** #### **What is FrostyFerret?** **FrostyFerret** is a credential stealer that targets macOS systems. When executed, it presents a fake UI prompting the victim for their system password. Regardless of whether the password is entered correctly, the malware exfiltrates the password to an external Dropbox location. #### **Behavior of FrostyFerret** - **Password Exfiltration**: Once the victim enters their password, FrostyFerret sends it to a remote server. - **Accessing Keychain Data**: This malware might also be used to access the user’s keychain for further credential harvesting. ### **Targets of ClickFake Interview: Centralized Finance (CeFi)** #### **Why CeFi is Targeted** Lazarus has shifted its focus from DeFi to **centralized finance (CeFi)** platforms, which act as intermediaries for cryptocurrency transactions. CeFi platforms like **Coinbase**, **Kraken**, **Bybit**, and **BlockFi** are prime targets due to their central control over user funds and transactions. #### **Profile of Victims** Unlike previous campaigns targeting software developers and engineers, the ClickFake Interview campaign has expanded its scope to include **non-technical profiles**, such as business development managers, asset managers, and decentralized finance specialists. This shift in targeting indicates a new strategy aimed at less technically savvy individuals, who are less likely to detect the malicious commands. ### **Detection and Hunting Opportunities** #### **ClickFix and Its Detection Challenges** The **ClickFix** tactic has evolved, making detection more difficult. However, security professionals can track suspicious activity by correlating behaviors such as **curl.exe**, **PowerShell**, and **wscript.exe** actions in quick succession. Custom detection rules can be created using tools like **Sigma** to identify these activities within a short time frame. ##### **Detection Using Sigma** Detection rules can correlate actions involving: - **curl.exe** used for downloading files - **PowerShell** for extracting archives - **wscript.exe** for executing scripts #### **Advanced Detection Using SOL** Another advanced method for detecting ClickFake activities involves using **Sekoia’s Operating Language (SOL)**, which allows security analysts to hunt for specific indicators like **curl** commands and **wscript** execution within a set time frame. ### **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)** #### **Network Indicators** - Malicious domains such as **vid-crypto-assess[.]com** and **blockassess[.]com** - Staging C2 servers like **api.camdriverhub[.]cloud** #### **File Hashes and Malware Indicators** - **GolangGhost** and **FrostyFerret** file hashes - Windows and macOS malware hashes indicating the presence of backdoors and credential stealers #### **YARA Rules for Detection** Sekoia provides a series of **YARA rules** to detect malicious files and scripts associated with the ClickFake Interview campaign. These rules help security teams identify GolangGhost backdoors and other malicious components in the malware chain.

loading..   03-Apr-2025
loading..   5 min read
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Anubis

FIN7

FIN7’s Anubis Backdoor hijacks Windows systems via compromised SharePoint sites....

The Russian cybercrime group **FIN7** (aka Savage Ladybug, Carbon Spider) has unleashed **Anubis**, a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows systems via compromised SharePoint instances and phishing campaigns. Designed for stealth and flexibility, Anubis enables remote command execution, file theft, and registry manipulation while evading detection. This Threatfeed dissects its technical architecture, attack lifecycle, and defensive countermeasures, providing a holistic view of one of 2024’s most insidious threats. ### **Anatomy of Anubis** #### **1. Delivery Mechanisms** FIN7 employs two primary vectors to deploy Anubis: - **Malspam Campaigns**: Phishing emails mimic legitimate invoices or corporate communications, urging victims to download ZIP files containing a decoy Python script. - **Compromised SharePoint Sites**: Malware hosted on trusted SharePoint domains bypasses URL reputation filters, exploiting organizational trust in Microsoft ecosystems. #### **2. Payload Obfuscation & Execution** The decoy script (30–50 lines of code) decrypts the primary payload using **AES-CBC encryption** with a unique key embedded in each sample. Example decryption logic: ```python from Crypto.Cipher import AES import base64 cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv) decrypted_payload = cipher.decrypt(base64.b64decode(encrypted_data)) exec(decrypted_payload) # In-memory execution to avoid disk writes ``` **Key Evasion Tactics**: - **Variable Obfuscation**: Uses `L`, `I`, and similar single-letter variables to hinder static analysis. - **Execution Variants**: Some samples write the decrypted payload to disk (e.g., `%TEMP%`), while others execute it directly in memory. ### **Command & Control (C2) Infrastructure** Anubis communicates with prioritized C2 servers via **TCP sockets**, failing over to backup IPs if blocked. All traffic is **base64-encoded**, mimicking benign web traffic. #### **Key C2 Features** - **Host Fingerprinting**: Upon infection, Anubis sends the host’s IP (detected via UDP socket to `8.8.8.8:80`) and process ID. - **Modular Design**: Operators dynamically inject scripts for tasks like keylogging, avoiding hardcoded malware features. ### **Anubis’ Arsenal: Full Command Breakdown** | **Command** | **Function** | **Risk Level** | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | `killexit` | Terminates the backdoor process. | Low | | `ip` | Fetches the host’s local and public IP addresses. | Medium | | `cd` | Changes the working directory (e.g., navigating to sensitive folders). | High | | `gt` | Exfiltrates files from the host to the C2 server. | Critical | | `up` | Uploads malicious files (e.g., ransomware) to the host. | Critical | | `env` | Harvests environment variables (e.g., API keys, credentials). | High | | `!cf!` | Modifies Windows Registry (e.g., `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows`). | Critical | | `!tcf!` | Scans TCP ports (default: 80, 443) on specified IPs for lateral movement. | High | | `!execpy!` | Executes attacker-provided Python code in a new thread (e.g., ransomware). | Critical | | `!mme` | Injects DLLs into memory using **PythonMemoryModule** (e.g., Cobalt Strike).| Critical | ### **Why Anubis Evades Detection** 1. **Fileless Execution**: No disk artifacts; payloads reside solely in memory. 2. **Legitimate Tool Abuse**: Uses Python (often whitelisted in enterprises) for malicious purposes. 3. **Lightweight Design**: Avoids bulky code; critical features (e.g., screenshot capture) are loaded remotely. 4. **Obfuscation Simplicity**: While rudimentary, variable renaming suffices against signature-based AVs. ### **FIN7’s Strategic Evolution** #### **From Data Theft to Ransomware** FIN7 has transitioned from POS malware and credit card theft (e.g., **Carbanak**) to a **ransomware affiliate model**. Recent activities include: - **AuKill Tool**: Advertised in July 2024 to disable security software (e.g., CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender). - **SharePoint Exploits**: Leveraging trusted platforms to bypass email attachment filters. #### **Enterprise Targeting** By hijacking SharePoint sites, FIN7 infiltrates networks where traditional perimeter defenses fail. Case studies reveal: - **Healthcare Sector**: Attackers exfiltrated patient data before deploying ransomware. - **Financial Institutions**: Stolen credentials used for SWIFT transaction fraud. ### **Mitigation Strategies** #### **Technical Defenses** 1. **Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)**: - Block `exec()` and `PythonMemoryModule` usage. - Monitor for base64-encoded TCP traffic on non-standard ports. 2. **Network Segmentation**: - Isolate SharePoint environments from critical assets. - Restrict outbound traffic to unknown IPs. 3. **Registry Hardening**: - Audit `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows` for unauthorized changes. #### **Policy & Training** - **Phishing Simulations**: Train staff to identify malspam lures (e.g., fake invoices). - **Zero-Trust Architecture**: Enforce MFA and least-privilege access for SharePoint. ### **Industry Insights** - **PRODAFT**: “Anubis isn’t just a backdoor—it’s a gateway for FIN7’s ransomware payloads. Its simplicity is its greatest weapon.” - **GDATA**: “The ability to execute arbitrary Python code makes attribution nearly impossible.” - **Microsoft Security Team**: “SharePoint compromises highlight the need for continuous configuration audits.” --- ### **Python Malware** Anubis underscores a growing trend of **offensive Python usage** in cybercrime due to: - Cross-platform compatibility. - Ease of integration with legitimate tools (e.g., PowerShell, Cobalt Strike). - Low detection rates in enterprise environments. FIN7’s Anubis Backdoor epitomizes the convergence of **stealth, adaptability, and enterprise targeting**. With SharePoint as a launchpad and Python as its engine, organizations must adopt **behavioral analytics** and **proactive threat hunting** to counter this evolving threat.

loading..   02-Apr-2025
loading..   4 min read